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I. INTRODUCTION
The bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) is a statutory defense to
intentional discrimination under Title VII.1 The BFOQ defense permits an em-
ployer to adopt an otherwise facially discriminatory employment practice if
"reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular busi-
ness .. *"2 Both the courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) have traditionally interpreted this defense very narrowly. A gen-
der-based employment classification, for example, qualifies as a BFOQ only if
the failure to adopt a single-sex policy undermines the employer's ability to
accomplish its essential business mission.3
A number of recent decisions by the circuit courts of appeal suggest an
emerging expansion of the BFOQ exception. These decisions recognize an ex-
panded BFOQ defense in two contexts. First, the courts of appeal for two cir-
cuits have upheld BFOQs based upon the apparent psychological or "role mod-
eling" needs of the employer's clientele.4 Secondly, the courts of appeal for
three circuits have reformulated the traditional framework for BFOQ analysis
in order to sustain fetal protection policies. 5
The courts have expanded the traditional scope of the BFOQ defense in
both of these settings through an increased deference to the employer's manage-
rial prerogative. This trend has been accompanied by a blurring of the once-
distinct line between the BFOQ defense, traditionally applicable in cases of in-
tentional discrimination, and the broader business necessity standard, tradition-
ally utilized only in testing the validity of facially neutral practices that have a
discriminatory impact. In pragmatic terms, this enhanced deference suggests a
reemergence of a judicial paternalism that bestows special protections but at the
price of gender inequality.
This Article explores this expansion of the BFOQ defense. The Article first
surveys the origin and traditional scope of the BFOQ defense.6 It then goes on
* [Editorial Note: The Supreme Court decided the Johnson Controls case just as this article was delivered to
the printer. Professor Befort has written an addendum that appears after the main body of the article which
summarizes the Johnson Controls decision and its likely impact on the scope and future development of the
BFOQ defense.]
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I. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
2. Id. § 2000e-2(e)(l). Most courts and commentators refer to the sections as found in the original Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Thus, the BFOQ provision is often referred to as section 703(e)(1).
3. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 336 (1977); Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442
F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
4. See infra notes 150-212 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 213-359 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 9-134 and accompanying text.
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to discuss the recent growth of the defense in both the role model and fetal
protection contexts.7 Finally, the Article critiques this trend and concludes that
the expansion is not consistent with either the core policy objectives of Title VII
or the recent Title VII rulings of the Supreme Court.'
II. BFOQ BASICS
A. Origin of the BFOQ Defense
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 creates a general prohibition
against discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.9 This same statute, however, provides employers with a de-
fense "in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin'0 is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal opera-
tion of that particular business or enterprise .... "I By far the most frequently
litigated application of the BFOQ defense is with respect to distinctions based
on gender.
12
The legislative history of the BFOQ provision is both sparse and un-
helpful. 13 Indeed, the legislative history contains no reference at all to the appli-
cation of the defense with respect to sex discrimination. 4 This paucity of legis-
7. See infra notes 135-67 (role-model), 204-79 (fetal protection) and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 168-203 (role-model), 280-308 (fetal protection) and accompanying text.
9. Section 703(a) of Title VlI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988) provides:
(a) Employer practices. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(I) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or
national origin.
10. The statutory BFOQ provision does not apply by its terms to classifications based on race or color. None-
theless, a "necessity" defense has been recognized on rare occasions where racial characteristics are necessary for
successful job performance. See Miller v. Texas State Bd. of Barber Examiners, 615 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1980)
(undercover investigator).
I1. Section 703(e)(1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-2(e)(l) (1988).
12. See M. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 286 (1988).
A statutory BFOQ defense is also included in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.
§ 621-634 (1967). For a discussion, see Rosenblum, Age Discrimination in Employment and the Permissibility of
Occupational Age Restrictions, 32 HASTINGS LJ. 1261 (1981); Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, 90 HARV. L. REV. 380 (1976); Note, The BFOQ Defense in ADEA Suits: The Scope of "Duties of
the Job", 85 MIca. L. REV. 330 (1986).
While this article focuses on the BFOQ defense in sex discrimination cases, occasional references to the
application of the BFOQ concept in age, religion and national origin cases are included because of the substantial
similarity in interpretation. See, e.g., Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985) (age); Pime v.
Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 803 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1986) (religion).
13. For a discussion of legislative history, see W. PEPPER & F. KENNEDY, SEX DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOY-
MENT (1981); Shaman, Toward Defining and Abolishing the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Based on
Class Status, 22 LAE. L.J. 332, 333-35 (1971) ("The Congress' understanding of the BFOQ's relationship to Title
VII was both superficial and confusing."); Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title VII and the Bona Fide Occupational
Qualification, 55 TEx. L. REV. 1025, 1027-33 (1977); Note, Classification on the Basis of Sex and the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, 50 IOWA L. REV. 778, 791-92 (1965).
14. See Note, supra note 13, at 792; UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 903 (7th Cir. 1989)
(Posner, J., dissenting).
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lative guidance is owing, in large measure, to the last minute addition of "sex"
as a protected classification under the proposed Civil Rights Act.' 5 As a result,
legislative history has had little impact on the subsequent interpretation of the
BFOQ defense to sex discrimination.'
The guidelines adopted by the EEOC in 196517 have played a far greater
role in shaping the development of the BFOQ defense. The guidelines specifi-
cally state "that the [BFOQ] exception as to sex should be interpreted nar-
rowly."' 8 The BFOQ defense, according to the guidelines, does not encompass a
refusal to hire an employee because of either stereotyped characterizations 9 or
the preferences of clients or coworkers.20 The guidelines expressly recognize the
need for a BFOQ in hiring only where "necessary for the purpose of authentic-
ity or genuineness . . . e.g. an actor or actress."' 2' As discussed below, the
courts, at least until recently, have closely adhered to this narrow construction
of the BFOQ defense.22
The EEOC guidelines, as amended in 1969,23 were also instrumental in
overcoming sex-specific, state protective statutes. These statutes, many of which
were enacted at the turn of the century, excluded women from various demand-
ing or hazardous jobs out of a concern for their assumed physical frailties and
child-bearing capabilities. 4 The courts have uniformly followed the EEOC
guidelines in holding that Title VII's ban on sex discrimination preempts these
sex-specific state laws.25 As one federal court of appeals judge has stated, these
protective statutes are now "museum pieces, reminders of wrong turns in the
law." 26
15. The amendment adding "sex" to the list of prohibited classifications was offered on the floor of the House
by an opponent of the bill one day before adoption and with the apparent intent of making the bill unacceptable to
most legislators. See W. PEPPER & F. KENNEDY, Supra, note 13, at 17-18; Sirota, supra note 13, at 1027; 110
CONG. REc. 2577-84 (1964).
16. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 950 (1971).
17. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (1988). Although the EEOC Guidelines bind only the Commission itself, courts
generally accord them considerable deference. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 n.19 (1977); Griggs
v. Duke Power, Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
18. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1988).
19. Id. § 1604.2(a)(I)(ii).
20. Id. § 1604.2(a)(l)(iii).
21. Id. § 1604.2(a)(2).
22. See infra notes 57-134 and accompanying text.
23. 34 Fed. Reg. 13,367-68 (1969) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(b)). The regulation states that state
protective laws that conflict with Title VII "will not be considered a defense to an otherwise established unlawful
employment practice or as a basis for the application of the [BFOQ] exception."
24. See J. BAER. THE CHAINS OF PROTECTION: THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO WOMEN'S LABOR LEGISLATION
14-106 (1978). The most frequently cited example of such legislation is the Oregon statute at issue in Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), which limited the number of working hours for women employed in factories and
laundries. The Court, in upholding the law, stated:
That woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage
in the struggle for subsistence is obvious. This is especially true when the burdens of motherhood are upon
her . . and as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of woman be-
comes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race.
Id. at 421.
25. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971); Vogel v. Trans World Airlines,
346 F. Supp. 805 (W.D. Mo. 1971).
26. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 913 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
B. Procedural Context
1. Two Theoretical Bases Summarized
A plaintiff may establish a Title VII violation under either of two theo-
ries-disparate treatment or disparate impact. The Supreme Court in Team-
sters v. United States27 summarized the distinction between these two theories
as follows:
"Disparate treatment" . is the most easily understood type of discrimination.
The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical,
although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in
treatment ...
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that stress "dis-
parate impact." The latter involve employment practices that are facially neutral in
their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than
another and cannot be justified by business necessity. . . . Proof of discriminatory
motive, we have held, is not required under a disparate impact theory.
2. Burden of Proof
A case of disparate treatment, then, is established by proof of a facially
discriminatory employment practice.28 A disparate impact violation, on the
other hand, is typically made out by statistical proof that illustrates the dispro-
portionate effect of a supposedly neutral employment practice.2 9
Each type of case entails distinct evidentiary frameworks and burden of
proof rules.30 The Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas v. Green,31 for exam-
ple, established a three-part stucture for proving a disparate treatment violation.
Under that test, the plaintiff must initially establish a prima facie case of dis-
crimination by presenting evidence of a facially discriminatory practice.3 2 The
burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its employment decision.33 If the employer succeeds in meeting this
burden, the plaintiff then has the opportunity to prove that the employer's prof-
fered reason was not the true reason but rather a pretext for discrimination.3 4
27. 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977).
28. See, e.g., id. at 335, n.15; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973).
29. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-32 (1971).
30. The burden of proof rules under Title VII are quite complex. They vary not only as to disparate treat-
ment and disparate impact cases, but also with respect to whether a disparate treatment claim alleges individual
or systemic discrimination or is perceived by the court to be a "pretext" or a "mixed motive" case. The Supreme
Court has attempted to clarify the respective burden of proof rules in two recent decisions. See Wards Cove
Packing v. Atonio, 109 S.Ct. 2115 (1989) (disparate impact); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S.Ct. 1775
(1989) (disparate treatment, mixed motive variety). For a discussion of the pertinent burden of proof rules follow-
ing these two decisions, see Belton, Causation and Burden-shifting Doctrines in Employment Discrimination Law
Revisited: Some Thoughts on Hopkins and Wards Cove, 64 TUL L. REv. 1359 (1990); Brooks, The Structure of
Individual Disparate Treatment Litigation after Hopkins, 6 LAB. LAw. 215 (1990).
31. 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973).
32. Id. at 802.
33. Id. In Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981), the Supreme Court
explained that the employer's burden is one of producing evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for its action.
The ultimate burden of proof, however, remains with the plaintiff during all three stages.
34. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
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The evidentiary framework of McDonnell Douglas has been refined in subse-
quent decisions to accommodate the various sub-types of disparate treatment
litigation, such as "mixed-motive" 35 and "systemic""a type cases.
3. The Role of the BFOQ Defense
The BFOQ is not a part of the evidentiary framework for establishing the
discriminatory nature of an employment practice. It is, instead, an affirmative
defense to facially discriminatory conduct that would otherwise violate Title
VII. While this answer may be simple, it deserves some elaboration.
The purpose of the McDonnell Douglas test is to provide a framework for
determining whether the employer engaged in a discriminatory employment
practice.37 This framework assists the court by allocating the respective burdens
of proof on this factual issue. Thus, the McDonnell Douglas structure helps the
court in a disparate treatment case to decide whether the employment decision
in question was the result of intentional discrimination or some other, nondis-
criminatory reason.
The BFOQ defense serves a very different function. As opposed to assisting
the court in determining whether the employer acted discriminatorily, the
BFOQ defense provides a justification for practices that are discriminatory. The
raison d'etre of the BFOQ concept is that a policy of overt bias is sometimes
"reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular busi-
ness. . . ."" An employer asserting a BFOQ defense is, in essence, saying "yes,
I discriminate on the basis of gender, but here is the reason why that policy is
necessary. ' 39 As such, the BFOQ defense not only serves a different purpose
from the McDonnell Douglas test but also arises at a different point in time.
The BFOQ, as an affirmative defense to otherwise discriminatory conduct,
35. A "mixed motive" case differs from a "pretext" case in that the pertinent inquiry is not whether the
employer's alleged rationale is true or false. Instead, the focus is on the relative impact of two causal factors that
led to the employment decision-one legitimate and the other discriminatory. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
109 S.Ct. 1775, 1788-89 (1989).
The employer bears a somewhat higher evidentiary burden in a mixed motive case, The Court in Price
Waterhouse stated that a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by showing that gender played a motivating
part in an employment decision, even though other nondiscriminatory reasons also may be involved. Id. at 1785.
Once this prima facie case is established, the employer may avoid a finding of liability only by showing "that it
would have made the same decision even if it would not have allowed the illegitimate consideration to play such a
role." Id. at 1787-88. The Court explained that this showing is in the nature of an affirmative defense as to which
the employer bears the burden of persuasion and not just a burden of producing evidence. Id. at 1788.
36. Systemic disparate treatment litigation is in the form of a class action that challenges a pattern or prac-
tice of an employer. The plaintiff must show that the employer regularly and purposefully treated the class unfa-
vorably. This proof is usually established by statistical evidence. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 431 U.S. 299 (1977).
37. See Trans World Airline, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 358, n.44 (1977). See also Note, Clearing the Mixed-Motive Smokescreen: An Approach to Disparate
Treatment Under Title VII, 87 MICH. L. REv. 863 (1989).
38. Section 703(c)(1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(I) (1988).
39. See Norwood v. Dale Maintenance Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410, 1415 n.3 (N.D. III. 1984) ("In effect,
an employer's claim of a bfoq for the position simultaneously admits gender-based discrimination and attempts to
justify it.").
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comes into play only after the factual issue posed by the McDonnell Douglas
test has been answered affirmatively. 40
4. Business Necessity Distinguished
The BFOQ defense, properly understood, is distinct from the business ne-
cessity concept with which it is sometimes confused.4' At least until recently,42
it was well settled that the BFOQ was a defense applicable in cases of disparate
treatment while the business necessity standard was applicable only in cases of
disparate impact.43
This dichotomy is well grounded in the different functions that these two
theories perform. As discussed above, a BFOQ is an affirmative defense to overt
discrimination that comes into play independent of the McDonnell Douglas
framework. 44 Business necessity, on the other hand, is an integral part of the
evidentiary framework in disparate impact cases.45 Its role is to dispel the infer-
ence of discrimination that arises because of the discriminatory impact of seem-
ingly neutral employment practices.46 Business necessity, accordingly, assists the
court in determining whether conduct is discriminatory in the first place.
These different functional roles result in two significant practical distinc-
tions as well. First, the burden of proof rules differ. As with any affirmative
defense,47 the burden of proving a BFOQ falls on the defendant-employer. 48
The employer's burden with respect to business necessity, however, is only that
of a burden of production. The Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing v.
Atonio4' held that the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuasion in estab-
lishing a case of disparate impact, including the business justification stage.
40. In practice, the assertion of a BFOQ defense is usually accompanied by an admission of gender discrimi-
nation. In that instance, the McDonnell Douglas proof process is bypassed entirely. See Norwood, 590 F. Supp. at
1415 n.3; Harden v. Dayton Human Rehabilitation Center, 520 F. Supp. 769 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
41. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 358-60 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter
SCHLEI & GROSSMAN] ("The courts have not always distinguished carefully between the statutory BFOQ defense
and the judicially established defense of business necessity."). See, e.g., Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reforma-
tory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1086 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 966 (1980) (court applied business necessity standard
under the rubric of BFOQ); Saunders v. Hercules, 510 F. Supp. 1137, 1141 (W.D. Va. 1981) (business necessity
standard applied in case of gender-based discrimination).
The business necessity standard is summarized in Comment, The Business Necessity Defense to Disparate-
Impact Liability Under Title VII, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 911 (1979).
42. See infra text accompanying note 284.
43. See, e.g., SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra, note 41 at 358-60; EEOC v. Rath Packing Co. 787 F.2d 318, 327
n.10 (8th Cir. 1986); Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994, 997 (5th Cir. 1984); Harriss v. Pan American
World Airways, 649 F.2d 670, 674 (9th Cir. 1980).
44. See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
45. See M. PLAYER, supra note 12, at 279, 282.
46. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
47. See Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural
Justice, 34 VA. L. REV. 1205, 1214-15 (1981) (defining and explaining the affirmative defense concept).
48. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 1789 (1989) ("when an employer has asserted
that gender is a bona fide occupational qualification. . . we have assumed that it is the employer who must show
why it must use gender as a criterion in employment."); Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d
1079, 1085-86 (8th Cir. 1980); Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1349 (D. Del. 1978).
49. 109 S.Ct. 2115, 2126 (1989). Prior to the Wards Cove decision, most courts apparently presumed that
business necessity was an affirmative defense as to which the employer bore the burden of proof. See id. (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
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Secondly, the BFOQ defense imposes a more demanding obligation on the
employer than does business necessity. As a justification for discriminating
against all members of a protected class, the BFOQ defense is, of necessity,
quite narrow." It is established only when a sex-based distinction is necessary
to actual job performance.51
The business necessity concept, in contrast, does not automatically exclude
members of a class. It operates instead as an analytical device for examining
neutral practices that impose a burden on members of a protected class. Ac-
cordingly, the focus in the business justification stage of a disparate impact case
is on the appropriateness of various job qualifications rather than on the legiti-
macy of a class-based exclusion. This explains the lower threshold for establish-
ing business necessity. The business necessity requirement is satisfied if an em-
ployment practice has a "manifest relationship" to job performance.52 The
Supreme Court in Wards Cove explained that:
The touchstone of this inquiry is a reasoned review of the employer's justification for
his use of the challenged practice. A mere insubstantial justification . . . will not suf-
fice. . . . At the same time, though, there is no requirement that the challenged prac-
tice be "essential" or "indispensable" to the employer's business for it to pass muster.
53
Business necessity, accordingly, encompasses considerations beyond a nar-
row focus on job performance, such as workplace safety," societal concerns for
environmental protection,"5 and, to a certain degree, an employer's interest in
cost containment.5" As described in the following section, this is considerably
less stringent than the BFOQ defense.
C. The BFOQ Test
The courts, with but a few early aberrations, 57 have closely adhered to the
EEOC's admonition "that the [BFOQ] exception as to sex should be interpreted
narrowly." 58 As Judge Posner has recently stated, a narrow reading is "inevita-
ble" in that a "broad reading would gut the statute.' 5
50. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977) (BFOQ is "an extremely narrow exception to the
general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex"). See also UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d
871. 903 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J., dissenting) ("A narrow reading is ... inevitable.").
51. See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 336 (the BFOQ defense requires courts to ask whether the employee's very
womanhood or manhood undermines his or her capacity to perform essential job requirements satisfactorily).
52. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
53. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct at 2126.
54. See Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1552 (11th Cir. 1984).
55. See Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1190 n.26 (4th Cir. 1982).
56. See Brodin, Costs, Profits, and Equal Employment Opportunity, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 318 (1987).
As this article points out, while a cost justification defense is not recognized as a BFOQ (see Los Angeles Dep't of
Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978)) cost containment considerations frequently play a major role
in establishing business necessity in disparate impact cases (see. e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440
U.S. 568 (1979)).
57. See Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967) (district court upheld practice of
banning women from jobs requiring lifting in excess of 35 pounds), rev'd, 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969). See also
Note, supra note 13, at 778 (argues for a broad, rational basis approach to establishing a BFOQ).
58. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1988).
59. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 903 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J., dissenting).
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While the courts have consistently read the BFOQ exception narrowly,
they have had more difficulty in formulating a precise test or definition. The
current test has evolved over the past twenty years from various competing defi-
nitions to an amalgamated three-part standard.
1. Evolution of a Standard
One of the earliest attempts at fashioning a test was by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit in Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph
Co. 6 0 In that case, the employer attempted to defend a policy of excluding
women from jobs requiring lifting in excess of thirty pounds as a BFOQ. The
court rejected this argument based on what became known as the "all or sub-
stantially all" test:
[T]o rely on the bona fide occupational qualification exception an employer has the
burden of proving that he had reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for
believing that all or substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and
efficiently the duties of the job involved. 1
Since the employer had failed to produce evidence that "all or substantially all"
women were incapable of safely lifting more than thirty pounds, the BFOQ was
not established.6 2
The Fifth Circuit used a different formulation two years later in Diaz v.
Pan American World Airways, Inc.68 There, the employer argued that being
female was a BFOQ for flight attendant positions. The court tested this policy
by means of an "essence" standard: "[D]iscrimination based on sex is valid only
when the essence of the business operation would be undermined by not hiring
members of one sex exclusively."84 Finding that the primary function of an air-
line is to transport passengers safely, the court concluded that whatever environ-
mental and cosmetic benefits result from an all-female flight attendant crew is
too tangential to the airline's business essence to qualify as a BFOQ.6 5
For a number of years, these two cases were viewed as offering competing
versions of the BFOQ test.66 Some commentators interpreted the Weeks test as
authorizing a broader reading of the BFOQ exception since it arguably justified
a class-based exclusion even though not all members of the class were incapable
of performing the requisite job duties.6 7 In practice, this broad reading did not
occur. Subsequent decisions gave Weeks a narrow construction relying on a
footnote in Weeks68 suggesting that the "all or substantially all" exclusion is
60. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
61. Id. at 235.
62. Id.
63. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
64. Id. at 388.
65. Id.
66. Other tests were also proposed but without the lasting impact of the Weeks and Diaz formulations. See,
e.g., Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971) (BFOQ must be based on unique sexual
characteristics, not merely on characteristics that Correlate with a particular sex); Note, supra note 13, at 795
(BFOQ should be found if the employer's class-based exclusion is supported by a rational basis).
67. See. e.g., SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 41 at 348: Sirota, supra note 13 at 348.
68. 408 F.2d 228, 235 n.5 (5th Cir. 1969).
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available only if it is impossible to test for necessary job skills on an individual-
ized basis.6"
Both the Weeks and Diaz standards were cited with approval by the Su-
preme Court in Dothard v. Rawlinson.7 0 The State of Alabama in that case
defended as a BFOQ its policy of hiring only male prison guards in male, maxi-
mum-security prisons using dormitory housing. The Court discussed the Weeks
and Diaz tests as two ways in which the BFOQ defense "has been variously
formulated." 7' 1 Without explicitly endorsing a specific test, the Dothard Court
went on to state that "whatever the verbal formulation [the BFOQ defense was]
meant to be an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of dis-
crimination on the basis of sex." 7' Nonetheless, the Court concluded that gen-
der was a BFOQ based upon the unique security concerns presented by the
Alabama institutions. The Court explained that the male, maximum-security
prisons using dormitory-style housing resulted in a peculiarly inhospitable envi-
ronment in which women would be subject to attack merely by virtue of their
sex. This, in turn, would undermine the ability of women to perform the essen-
tial job responsibility of maintaining prison security.73
Following Dothard, the courts increasingly began to use a test that com-
bined the elements of both the Weeks and Diaz standards.7 4 This unified ap-
proach makes sense since the two standards relate to different aspects of the
BFOQ exception. The "essence" test is concerned with identifying essential at-
tributes of job performance while the "all or substantially all" test is concerned
with whether a class-based exclusion is the only feasible means of identifying
those who are incapable of performing these job attributes . 7  A third element
has more recently been added in cases raising privacy or security concerns. In
those instances, a BFOQ will be sustained, even if the combined Weeks/Diaz
test is met, only if the defendant also shows that no reasonable alternative exists
that will accomplish the employer's business mission with less discriminatory
impact.7
6
2. The Test
The assertion of a BFOQ will succeed only if the employer establishes all
three portions of the current test. Each of these elements is discussed below.
69. See, e.g.. Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 235-37 (5th Cir. 1976).
70. 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977).
71. Id. at 333.
72. Id. at 333-34.
73. Id. at 335-37.
74. See, e.g., Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985) (age discrimination case); Hardin v.
Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1370 (11th Cir. 1982); Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 299
(N.D. Tex. 1981). See generally Note, Employment Discrimination-U.S. Employers in Foreign Countries: Is
Customer Preference a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification, 31 U. KAN. L. REv. 183, 194 (1982); M. PLAYER,
supra note 12 at 281-82.
75. See Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 299.
76. See, e.g., Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994, 1000-02 (5th Cir. 1984) (safety); Fesel v. Ma-
sonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1351 (D. Del. 1978) (privacy).
1991]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
a. Business Essence
As established in the Diaz case, the employer must prove that members of
one sex could not safely or efficiently perform essential job duties. The key re-
quirement here is that the job duties must be essential in nature and not merely
tangential or peripheral.7
Like Diaz, many of the decisions focusing on the "business essence" factor
have involved airline employees, with the most celebrated case being that of
Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co. 7 8-- the "love airline" case. Southwest was a
struggling commuter airline that gained national and international attention in
the 1970s for its "love" image. As in Diaz, Southwest had a policy of hiring
only female employees for customer contact positions such as flight attendants
and ticket agents.79 Southwest, however, went beyond this policy to make the
airline a "personification of feminine youth and vitality."80 Unabashed allusions
to love and sex pervaded all aspects of Southwest's operation, including its ad-
vertising campaigns.81
Southwest attempted to distinguish Diaz by asserting that its female-only
personnel policy went to the essence of its unique, corporate persona as the
"love airline." 2 In Diaz, the Fifth Circuit rejected Pan American's BFOQ
claim because the airline's customer preference arguments were based on con-
cerns that were merely tangential to the airline's primary function of safely
transporting passengers.8" In Wilson, Southwest argued that transporting pas-
sengers with "love" was its business essence. The female-only hiring policy, the
airline contended, was not only necessary to accomplish this business mission,
but was crucial to the airline's financial success.8 4
The Wilson court soundly rejected Southwest's argument and emphasized
three now well-established points that illustrate the restrictive scope of the
BFOQ defense. First, sex discrimination cannot be justified by the preferences
of customers or coworkers.85 To allow a BFOQ because of a customer's prefer-
ence for a female flight attendant or a male salesman would only serve to per-
petuate the very prejudices that Title VII was meant to overcome.88 Secondly,
the fact that eradicating discrimination may impose a financial burden does not,
in itself, give rise to a BFOQ defense.8 7 The financial burden of constructing a
new bathroom for female employees or of dropping a "love airline" persona is
77. Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950
(1971).
78. 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
79. Id. at 295.
80. Id. at 294.
81. Id. Southwest advertised that "WE'RE SPREADING LOVE ALL OVER TEXAS." Television com-
mercials featured attractive attendants promising in-flight love. On board, attendants in hot pants and high boots
served "love bites" and "love potions." Id. at n.4.
82. Id. at 294, 300.
83. Diaz, 442 F.2d at 387-88.
84. Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 300, 303-04.
85. Id. at 301-02. See also EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(l)(iii) (1990); Gerdom v. Continental
Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 609 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1074 (1983); Diaz, 442 F.2d at 389.
86. See Diaz, 442 F.2d at 389; Note, supra note 74, at 189.
87. Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 303-04.
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simply an acceptable and necessary cost of eliminating discrimination. 8 Finally,
the Wilson court held that the business essence requirement must be interpreted
narrowly and specifically. In this regard, the court stated that "'[love' is the
manner of job performance, not the job performed," which, for Southwest Air-
lines, was the transporting of passengers.89 The court in Wilson stressed that
there is "no principled limit" to allowing an employer to define its business
mission in a self-serving, discriminatory manner that is not narrowly tailored
toward furtherance of the essential function of the employer's business.9°
The business essence element of the BFOQ test is satisfied only if a nondis-
criminatory policy would preclude the successful performance of the employer's
primary business mission. In Dothard v. Rawlinson,91 for example, the Supreme
Court recognized a BFOQ because the employment of women guards in the
setting of Alabama's "peculiarly inhospitable" male, maximum-security prisons
would undermine the ability of the guards to provide prison security. Similarly,
even customer preference may apparently constitute a BFOQ if it is so extreme
as to result in a complete impossibility of performance. 92
b. "All or Substantially All"
The second element of the BFOQ test requires an employer to show that
"all or substantially all" members of one sex could not adequately perform the
essence of the job. 3 The purpose of this prerequisite is to compel employers to
make employment decisions on factors other than gender-based stereotypical
assumptions.9 ' For example, in the Weeks decision that first enunciated this
standard, the court invalidated a policy that barred women from jobs requiring
lifting in excess of thirty pounds because the employer failed to produce evi-
dence that "all or substantially all" women could not accomplish this task.95
Even if it were established by statistical evidence that fewer women than men
could lift thirty pounds, this still would not justify the automatic exclusion of all
women applicants as a BFOQ. So long as individual testing for the required job
88. See M. PLAYER, supra note 12, at 288; Brodin, supra note 56, at 320.
89. Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 302.
90. Id. at 304.
91. 433 U.S. 321, 334-36 (1977). On the other hand, the Dothard Court noted that a BFOQ would not be
established if the only concern was for the safety of the female guards as opposed to the maintenance of prison
security. Id. at 335.
92. See Kern v. Dynalectron Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (BFOQ found in religious discrimi-
nation case where helicopter pilot working for American company in Saudi Arabia and with job responsibility of
flying over holy area of Mecca during Moslem pilgrimages was compelled to convert to Islam or suffer punishment
of beheading). But cf. Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981) (multinational company's
concern that its South American clients would refuse to deal with female director of international operations does
not constitute a BFOQ).
93. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
94. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977); Note, Developments in the Law-Employment
Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1178-79 (1971).
95. Weeks, 517 F. Supp. at 235-36.
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trait is possible, an employment policy based on gender is not permissible unless
gender itself serves as the basis for exclusion." As one court has stated:
The premise of Title VII . . is that women are now to be on equal footing with men.
The footing is not equal if a male employee may be appointed to a particular position
on a showing that he is physically qualified, but a female employee is denied an oppor-
tunity to demonstrate personal physical qualification. Equality of footing is established
only if employees otherwise entitled to the position, whether male or female, are ex-
cluded only upon a showing of individual capacity.97
In addition to stereotypical assumptions about work abilities, Title VII also
prohibits employment decisions based upon the perceived special sensitivities of
women employees. In Dothard, the Supreme Court debunked this sort of "ro-
mantic paternalism" as a criterion for job selection.98 Although the Dothard
Court found a BFOQ because of security needs, it stressed that a female should
not be precluded from a job because of the perception that it is too dangerous
for women. The Court stated that "it is the purpose of Title VII to allow the
individual woman to make that choice herself." 99
This element is also a difficult one to meet. The "all or substantially all"
standard is satisfied only if gender itself is an absolute bar to job performance
or if virtually all members of one sex are unable to perform and testing for
individual capabilities is not feasible. As described below, the eye of this needle
is generally threaded only in cases involving concerns for bodily privacy 00 or
where pregnancy poses unreasonable safety risks to third parties.10 1
c. Less Discriminatory Alternatives
Even if these first two elements are satisfied, an employer asserting a
BFOQ defense must also show the absence of reasonable alternatives that could
accomplish its business mission with a less discriminatory impact. If such an
accommodation is possible, the employer may not continue to use the more
stringent gender-based exclusion.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Hardin v.
Stynchcomb' °2 illustrates the typical impact of this factor. There, a county sher-
iff's department had a policy of assigning only male deputies to positions in the
male section of the county jail in order to protect inmate privacy. The court
stated that this policy could be sustained as a BFOQ only if the department
showed that job responsibilities could not be rearranged "in a way that would
eliminate the clash between the privacy interests of the inmates and the employ-
ment opportunities of female deputy sheriffs."103 In this particular case, only a
96. See Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971); EEOC v. Spokane Products, 534 F.
Supp. 518, 523-24 (E.D. Wash. 1982). See also Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a
Form of Employment Discrimination, 21 B.C. L. REv. 301, 414 (1980); Note, supra note 94, at 1178-79.
97. Rosenfeld, 444 F.2d, at 1225 (citations omitted).
98. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335 (1977).
99. Id.
100. See infra notes 113-20 and accompanying text.
101. See infra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
102. 691 F.2d 1364 (11th Cir. 1982).
103. Id. at 1371 (citations omitted).
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minor portion of the deputies' time was spent in intrusive tasks such as con-
ducting strip searches or observing shower facilities. Accordingly, the court in-
validated the single-sex policy because the department had failed to show that
the use of selective work assignments could not protect inmate privacy without
impinging on equal employment opportunity. 04
The "less discriminatory alternative" element serves to assure that a gen-
der-based employment policy is "reasonably necessary" within the meaning of
the statutory BFOQ provision. If a reasonable accommodation is possible, such
as by selective work assignments, then a broader policy of gender exclusion is
not "reasonably necessary" as a BFOQ. On the other hand, an employer will
not be required to restructure the workplace in a manner that will result in an
undue hardship. For example, courts have held than an employer need not dis-
pense with a single-sex policy if the only less discriminatory alternative necessi-
tates the hiring of additional staff' 05 or the assignment of employees to positions
for which they are not qualified or trained. 0
3. The Test Applied
This three-part BFOQ test creates a very narrow exception to Title VII's
ban on sex discrimination. The test serves to limit the exception to those rare
instances in which gender is essential to job performance. The courts also have
applied the test stringently with the result that very few cases, at least until
recently, have sustained BFOQs based on gender.
The relatively few BFOQs that have been recognized tend to fall into three
categories: authenticity, privacy, and safety.
a. Authenticity
The EEOC guidelines recognize sex as a BFOQ in only one con-
text-"[w]here it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness
• ..e.g. an actor or actress.' 0 7 This type of BFOQ reflects a societal prefer-
ence for physical modeling by members of the sex depicted even though mem-
bers of the opposite sex could also perform the task in question. 08 Clearly, au-
thenticity is a narrow basis for a BFOQ. Other likely examples of BFOQs based
on "authenticity" are fashion models, undercover detectives, and dating service
escorts. 09
104. Id. at 1373-74. See also Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1086-87 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980); Reynolds v. Wise, 375 F. Supp 145, 151 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
105. See Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1354 (D. Del. 1978).
106. See Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994, 1001-02 (5th Cir. 1984).
107. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2) (1990).
108. It is possible for actors and actresses to play opposite sex roles, e.g. a male Lady MacBeth or a female
Peter Pan. Nonetheless, the attributes of a particular sex are often essential ingredients to the success of physical
role modeling, especially in the entertainment industry. "Though Title VII attempts to correct misapprehensions
and stereotypes based on sex, it does not attempt to further the proposition that men and women are interchangea-
ble for other, nonemployment purposes." Note, supra note 94, at 1181-82.
109. See Button v. Rockefeller, 76 Misc. 2d 701, 704-05, 351 N.Y.S. 2d 488, 492 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973)
(undercover detective assignments); Note, supra note 94, at 1182 (dating service escort).
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At some point, of course, the "authenticity" exception collides with the
principle that customer preference does not justify a BFOQ. This tension arises
most frequently with respect to employment preferences based on sex appeal.
As discussed above, a hiring preference for female flight attendants fails as a
BFOQ because sex appeal is not the "essence" of an airline's business. 10 Sex
appeal, however, may well constitute the essence of a nightclub featuring scant-
ily-clad dancers of either sex.111 One court, in attempting to fashion a line of
demarcation, has stated that a BFOQ should be recognized on the basis of sex
appeal only where "vicarious sex entertainment is the primary service provided"
and not just a marketing scheme to enhance profits." 2
b. Privacy
A second source of successful BFOQ claims are premised on concerns for
bodily privacy. These cases typically involve occupations that entail responsibili-
ties for a clientele whose bodies are sometimes fully or partially unclothed. For
example, courts have recognized privacy-based BFOQs for labor and delivery
nurses,"'1 washroom attendants,"" and nurse's aide positions at a residential
care facility for the elderly. 15
The principal issue in most of the privacy cases is whether the employer
can rearrange job responsibilities in order to minimize the clash between pri-
vacy interests and Title VII's prohibition on employment discrimination. If such
an accommodation is possible, a blanket policy of excluding members of one sex
will not support a BFOQ."'
The vast majority of privacy cases arise in either prison or health care set-
tings. While both settings involve similar intrusions on bodily privacy, the re-
sults in these two contexts are remarkably dissimilar.
The courts in the prison cases have consistently denied BFOQ status for
guard positions at either male or female facilities. These cases typically reject
gender-based hiring practices in lieu of the less discriminatory alternative of
selectively assigning same-sex guards for the most intrusive job tasks."17
110. See supra notes 78-90 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., St. Cross v. Playboy Club, Appeal No. 773, Case No. CFS 22618-70 (N.Y. Human Rights
Appeal Bd. 1971) (female gender is a BFOQ for job as a Playboy bunny).
112. Wilson v. Southwest Airline Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 301-02 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
113. Backus v. Baptist Medical Center, 510 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 671
F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. Mercy Health Center, 29 FEP Cases 159 (W.D. Okla. 1982).
114. Norwood v. Dale Maintenance Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410 (N.D. III. 1984); Brooks v. ACF Indus..
Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. W.Va. 1982).
115. Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978).
116. See, e.g., Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1373 (1 1th Cir. 1982); Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210,
1217 (2d Cir. 1980).
117. See, e.g., Hardin, 691 F.2d, at 1373; Forts, 621 F.2d at 1217; Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reforma-
tory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1086-87 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980); Reynolds v. Wise, 375 F. Supp. 145,
151 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
One commentator has summarized these cases as follows:
In the prison opinions a consistent rule emerges: an opposite-sex guard cannot be presumptively de-
nied employment. In no prison cases except those addressing the rights of juveniles have the courts held
Title VII rights to be inferior to perceived rights of prisoners' privacy. In most cases, the prison adminis-
tration has been ordered to separate only the most invasive tasks and reassign those to same-sex guards.
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In contrast, three health care cases,118 with only a minimal glance toward
the possibility of restructuring work assignments, have upheld policies that ban
the hiring of male nurses for predominantly female patient care tasks. As one
commentator has concluded, "these hospital cases are simply wrong." '119 Admit-
tedly, privacy concerns are based on real distinctions between the sexes and
pose a legitimate limit on equality in employment. But the legitimacy ceases
unless both female and male privacy concerns are treated similarly. All three of
these health care cases involve one-way policies that ban male nurses from car-
ing for female patients but not the converse situation. This is precisely the type
of sexual stereotyping and customer preference bases for discrimination that
Title VII attempts to eliminate.12 0
c. Safety
A BFOQ may also arise because of concerns for safety. Here, the concern
is not with the danger posed by a particular job to a prospective employee, but
with the extent to which gender may undermine the performance of the job
itself.' 21
The most frequent arena in which BFOQs based on safety concerns have
been asserted is under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
which contains a BFOQ exception similar to that of Title VII.' 2 ' The courts, for
example, have upheld age restrictions under the ADEA for jobs with significant
safety responsibilities such as police officers 23 and bus drivers. 24 Some early
ADEA cases suggested that the courts should defer broadly to considerations of
public safety in making BFOQ determinations . 25 This approach was rejected
by the Supreme Court in Western Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell,"' a case in which
the Court declined to find an age sixty BFOQ for airline flight engineers. While
acknowledging that safety considerations are a legitimate factor, 27 the Court
Comment, Privacy as Rationale for the Sex-based BFOQ, 3 DET. C. L. REV. 865, 893 (1985). The prison cases
are also analyzed in Comment, Sex Discrimination in Prison Employment: The Bona Fide Occupational Qualifi-
cation and Prisoners' Privacy Rights, 65 IOWA L. REV. 428 (1980).
118. Backus, 510 F. Supp. 1191; Fesel, 447 F. Supp. 1346; Mercy Health Center, 29 FEP Cases 159.
119. Comment, supra note 117, at 880. A possible basis for distinguishing the prison and health care cases is
that prisoners have a lesser constitutional right to privacy than do hospital patients. See generally Backus, 510 F.
Supp. at 1193. However, the Comment correctly notes that all three of the health care cases involved private
facilities and, accordingly, do not implicate a constitutional right to privacy. Comment, supra note 117, at 882.
120. See EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(l)(ii) and (iii) (1990).
121. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335-36 (1977); Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal
Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. CHi. L. REV. 1219, 1253 (1986) ("the 'safety exception' has been limited to in-
stances in which sex or pregnancy actually interferes with the employee's ability to perform the job").
122. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988). The ADEA provides that "[i]t
shall not be unlawful for an employer . . . to take any action otherwise prohibited . . . where age is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business . Id. §
623(0(1).
123. See, e.g., EEOC v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 748 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1984).
124. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974).
125. See, e.g., EEOC v. City of Janesville, 630 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1980); Hodgson, 499 F.2d 859.
126. 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
127. The Criswell Court quoted a decision of the Fifth Circuit that articulated a sliding scale standard in
safety cases: "The greater the safety factor, measured by the likelihood of harm and the probable severity of that
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stated that safety-based BFOQs must pass muster under the same narrow stan-
dard as any other BFOQ claim."2 8
Except for the Supreme Court's decision in Dothard,'29 which has been
strictly limited in precedential terms to the "peculiarly inhospitable" conditions
of the Alabama prison system, 8° the only sex discrimination cases under Title
VII recognizing a safety BFOQ have involved pregnancy.' 3' The courts, in a
number of cases, have upheld airline policies grounding pregnant flight attend-
ants. 3 2 The basis of this BFOQ flows from the fear that passenger safety would
be endangered because of the likelihood that pregnant attendants would not
perform adequately in emergency situations. 33 The courts have found these pol-
icies justified, even though some attendants could continue to perform ade-
quately up to the twentieth week of pregnancy, because of the difficulty of iden-
tifying in advance those specific pregnant attendants who would be
incapacitated in emergency situations. 3 4
III. RECENT EXPANSION OF THE BFOQ DEFENSE
Five recent decisions of the circuit courts of appeal signal an apparent ex-
pansion of the traditionally narrow BFOQ defense. These cases arise in two
different contexts. First, two decisions recognize BFOQs based on the psycho-
logical or role-modeling needs of the employer's clientele. The other three cases
sustain policies that exclude women from certain positions because of fetal pro-
tection concerns. The courts in both settings stretch the BFOQ defense to re-
semble more nearly the broader business necessity standard.
A. The Role-Model BFOQ
The theoretical basis for a role-model BFOQ is that a single-sex employ-
ment policy is necessary to the success of the employer's business mission be-
cause of the psychological needs of the clientele. This defense is asserted most
harm in case of an accident, the more stringent may be the job qualification designed to ensure safe[ty]." Cris-
well, 472 U.S. at 413, citing Usery v. Tamiami Trails Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 236 (5th Cir. 1976).
128. The Court in Criswell rejected the employer's contention that the ADEA only requires a rational basis
standard for establishing age as a BFOQ. Criswell, 472 U.S. at 419-23. Noting the similarities between the
ADEA and Title VII, the Court concluded that the narrow BFOQ test used in Title ViI cases was also appropri-
ate under the ADEA. Id. at 413-18.
129. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
130. See M. PLAYER, supra note 12 at 287 and cases cited in n.35.
131. Title VII was amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in 1978 so as to overrule General Electric
v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) and make employment distinctions based on pregnancy per se acts of sex discrimi-
nation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988); see Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669,
684 (1983). Thus, pregnancy-based policies after the amendment constitute disparate treatment based on sex and
must be evaluated in terms of the BFOQ defense as opposed to the business necessity burden of production. See
Harriss v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670, 676 (9th Cir. 1980); Buss, Getting Beyond Discrimi-
nation: A Regulatory Solution to the Problem of Fetal Hazards in the Workplace, 95 YALE L.J. 577, 584 (1986).
132. See, e.g., Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1984) (attendants removed from flight
duty upon discovery of pregnancy); Harriss. 649 F.2d 670 (mandatory leave upon pregnancy); Burwell v. Eastern
Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980) (mandatory leave policy after first thirteen weeks of pregnancy).
133. See, e.g., Levin, 730 F.2d at 997.
134. See id. at 998.
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frequently with respect to positions involved in the training or rehabilitation of
minors or vulnerable adults.13 5
A handful of early EEOC13 6 and state court opinions hinted at a role-
model BFOQ.137 The federal courts, however, had not been receptive to this
attempted justification-at least until recently.
The most frequently litigated setting for attempted role-model BFOQs is
with respect to school teachers. In a number of cases, school boards have at-
tempted to justify the termination of single, pregnant teachers on the grounds
that they provide an inappropriate, negative role-model for their students. Fol-
lowing the adoption of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in 1978,138 distinc-
tions based on pregnancy constitute per se disparate treatment because of sex
unless saved by establishing a BFOQ.1 9 The courts, however, consistently re-
jected the negative role model theory as rising to the level of a BFOQ necessary
to the success of the school's educational mission . 40
A federal district court in Jatczak v. Ochburge4l similarly rejected the role-
model theory. There, the court held that an employer could not refuse to con-
sider female applicants for a child-care worker position in a sheltered workshop
for mentally ill youths. The workshop argued that a male BFOQ was necessary
in order to provide an appropriate role model for a predominantly male popula-
tion. The workshop claimed that a female could not successfully perform the job
duties because many of the male patients had "negative experiences with fe-
males in positions of authority."'1
4
Along the lines of the consumer preference cases,' 4 3 the Jatczak court re-
jected the employer's asserted BFOQ by defining narrowly the "essence" of the
employer's business. The court stated that the "essential purpose of the work-
shop was to teach work skills and appropriate work behavior.' 44 Role modeling
and counseling functions, on the other hand, were found to be merely ancillary
functions.' 45 Given this determination, the court analyzed the expert testimony
135. See Sirota, supra note 13 at 1069. ("One could argue that when the essence of a business or position is
to furnish children with the educational and psychological advantages of exposure to a male [or female] image
lacking in their homes, an employer could justify its discrimination on the basis of a psychosexual BFOQ.").
136. See EEOC Dec. LA 68-4-538E, 2 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 537 (1969) (refusing to accept
BFOQ favoring a male teacher based on the perceived need for a male image).
137. See Long v. State Personnel Bd., 41 Cal. App. 3d 1000, 116 Cal. Rptr. 562 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974)
(interpreting state law patterned after Title VII to allow a male BFOQ for the position of chaplain in a youth
facility based on privacy, discipline and security grounds); City of Philadelphia v. Pa. Human Relations Comm'n,
7 Pa. Commw. 500, 300 A.2d 97 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1972) (interpreting federal law to allow a male BFOQ for
supervisors in a youth center based on both privacy and emotional grounds).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
139. See supra note 131.
140. See. e.g.. Avery v. Homewood Bd. of Educ., 674 F.2d 337, 341 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S.
943; Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate School Dist., 507 F.2d 611, 617 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 425 U.S.
559 (1976); Dolter v. Wahlert High School, 483 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Iowa 1980). See also Ponton v. Newport
News School Bd., 632 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D. Va. 1986) (decided on constitutional grounds but with similar
reasoning).
141. 540 F. Supp. 698 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
142. Id. at 701.
143. See supra notes 78-92 and accompanying text.
144. Jatczak, 540 F. Supp. at 704.
145. Id.
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and concluded that the exclusion of female employees was not necessary to fur-
ther the goal of teaching appropriate work behavior.14
The Jatczak court's conclusion, as well as its mode of analysis, is consistent
with the traditionally narrow interpretation of the BFOQ exception. Two more
recent decisions, however, have expanded beyond this traditional approach in
recognizing role-model BFOQs.
1. The Role-Model Cases
In Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 47 the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the Omaha Girls Club was justified in discriminating against
single, pregnant women. The Club is a private, nonprofit corporation that pro-
vides programs designed to assist females between the ages of eight and eigh-
teen, the majority of whom are black, "to maximize their life opportunities.' 48
The plaintiff was a black, single woman employed by the club as an arts
and crafts instructor. She was fired from this position for violating the club's
"role-model rule" which banned negative role modeling, including single-parent
pregnancies. 49
The court of appeals tested the validity of the role-model rule under both
the disparate impact and the disparate treatment theories. The court found that
the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of disparate impact because the
role-model rule would impact blacks to a greater extent than whites because of
the former's higher fertility rate. 50 Nonetheless, the court sustained the rule
based on a finding of business necessity. Noting that validation studies based on
empirical evidence were not available on this issue, the court relied on two other
pieces of evidence in finding that business necessity supported the rule. First,
the court pointed to the employer's belief that single, pregnant staff members
"would convey the impression that the Girls Club condoned pregnancy for the
girls in the age group it serves" while, in fact, "teenage pregnancy is contrary to
[the Club's] purpose and philosophy."'' Secondly, the court made a passing
reference to expert testimony indicating that the role-model rule could be help-
ful in preventing teenage pregnancy.152 The Chambers court rejected the alter-
native disparate treatment argument in summary fashion. 53 Citing to an earlier
146. Id. at 704-05.
147. 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987), a~fg 629 F. Supp. 925 (D. Neb. 1986).
148. Id. at 698.
149. Id. at 699.
150. Id. at 701.
151. Id. at 701-02.
152. Id. at 702.
153. The court's truncated discussion of the disparate treatment claim apparently reflects the trial court's
mishandling of this issue. The trial court had concluded that the role-model rule did not establish a case of
disparate treatment and, accordingly, never reached the BFOQ issue. Chambers, 629 F. Supp. at 947-48.
This determination was clearly in error because it failed to consider the impact of the Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act amendment to Title VII. This amendment, adopted in 1978, overturned existing case law by providing
that distinctions based on pregnancy constitute overt sex discrimination. Thus, a case of disparate treatment was
automatically established by virtue of the role-model rule itself. The appellate court glossed over these inadequa-
cies and simply concluded that its finding of business necessity "is persuasive as to the existence of a BFOQ."
Chambers, 834 F.2d at 704.
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Eighth Circuit case that had erroneously described the BFOQ defense in terms
of the elements of the business necessity test,'54 the court stated that the two
concepts were substantially similar so as to obviate the need for independent
analysis of the traditionally stricter BFOQ standard.155
The Seventh Circuit also recognized the possibility of a psychologically
based BFOQ in Torres v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health and Social Servs. 56 The
en banc majority opinion in Torres reversed a district court decision that had
invalidated a personnel policy restricting certain correctional-officer positions at
Taycheedah Correctional Institution (TCI), a women's maximum security
prison in Wisconsin, to female employees.
The exclusively female guard policy at issue in Torres was adopted in 1980
by TCI's new superintendent. Prior to that time, TCI employed both male and
female guards but made selective work assignments to protect inmate pri-
vacy.157 At the trial court level, the state defended the policy on three
grounds-privacy, security, and rehabilitation. The district court, citing a host
of other prison cases denying same-sex BFOQs for guards, rejected all three
grounds.1 58 With respect to the rehabilitation argument, the trial court stated
that the defendants offered only a "theory of rehabilitation" as a justification
with "no objective evidence, either from empirical studies or otherwise, display-
ing the validity of their theory." 159
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the trial court's rejection of the privacy
and security contentions, but reversed on the rehabilitation issue.160 In doing so,
the court gave considerable deference to the employer's business judgment. Ar-
ticulating the traditional BFOQ test, the Seventh Circuit first attempted to
identify the "essence" of TCI's business. The court stressed that the business
essence should be defined with particularity'61 and then found that TCI's busi-
ness essence was not merely that of administering a penal institution but, more
precisely, also encompassed the unique mission of operating a women's maxi-
mum security facility. Included among the goals of such a facility, the court
concluded, was the task of inmate rehabilitation.6 2
154. See Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1086 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
966 (1980).
155. Chambers, 834 F.2d at 704 (8th Cir. 1987).
156. 859 F.2d 1523 (7th Cir. 1988), rev'g 639 F. Supp. 271 (E.D. Wis. 1986), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1017
(1989).
157. Id. at 1524-25.
158. Torres, 639 F. Supp. at 278-82. Plaintiffs argued at the district court level that the state should not be
permitted to assert the security and rehabilitation justifications because only privacy concerns were cited at the
time of the policy's adoption. The district court indicated that it did not need to rule on this objection since it
found each of these theories to be insufficient to support a BFOQ in any event. Id. at 278.
159. Id. at 280.
160. Torres, 859 F.2d at 1528, 1532-33.
161. Id. at 1528. The deferential manner in which the Tortes court defined TCI's business mission was
presaged in a religious discrimination case decided two years earlier. In Pime v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 803
F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1986), the Seventh Circuit sustained a hiring preference for Jesuits for teaching positions in
the philosophy department after finding that a "jesuit presence" was important to the successful operation of the
university. Id. at 353.
162. Torres, 859 F.2d at 1529-30.
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Having deferred to the state's description of its business mission, the court
further deferred with respect to the second prong of the BFOQ test by ac-
cepting the state's conclusion that the employment of male guards would under-
mine its ability to accomplish the goal of rehabilitation. The Eighth Circuit
chastised the lower court for apparently requiring the defendants to meet an
"unrealistic, and therefore unfair burden" in producing empirical evidence to
support the necessity of the BFOQ. 6 3 The court of appeals, instead, noted the
need for innovation in the administration of women's penal institutions and
stated that the reasoned judgments of prison administrators are entitled to
"substantial weight." 164
Although the court remanded this second issue to the district court for fur-
ther consideration, 65 the court left little room for doubt as to the anticipated
outcome. The superintendent had made a professional judgment, the court
noted, that providing women prisoners with an environment free from the pres-
ence of males in a position of authority was necessary to foster the goal of
rehabilitation. She based this decision, in part, on the high percentage of in-
mates who had been physically and sexually abused by men.161 Without point-
ing to any specific testimony, the court also found significant the fact that the
exclusion of male guards was considered to be a reasonable approach by some
professional penologists.167
2. The Role-Model Expansion Critiqued
The Chambers and Torres decisions significantly expand the traditional
scope of the BFOQ defense. The Torres case makes the BFOQ exception more
accessible by adjusting each of the elements of the BFOQ test. The Chambers
court does much the same by adopting the business necessity standard as a
substitute for the BFOQ test.
The Torres court lowers the hurdle posed by the business essence element
of the BFOQ test by deferring to the employer's own, self-serving assessment of
its business mission. The Seventh Circuit's finding that rehabilitation is an es-
sential part of TCI's normal business operations is based on weak, inferential
evidence created by the employer itself. The court in Torres based this finding
on language contained in portions of the Wisconsin Administrative Code.168 Of
the two provisions cited, one only indirectly refers to rehabilitation as a goal of
the prison,1 69 while the other refers to rehabilitation as a goal of prison rules,
163. Id. at 1532.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1530.
167. Id. at 1532.
168. Torres, 859 F.2d at 1530. The text of these provisions is set forth infra notes 169-70.
169. One of the provisions the court cites is a statement of purpose for a chapter of the code dealing with
prison security. The text of this provision states:
Pursuant to authority vested in the department of health and social services by ss. 46.03 (6)(b), 53.07 and
227.014(2), Stats., the department adopts this chapter for purposes of establishing security procedures at
correctional institutions and establishing guidelines which permit inmates to participate in activities within
a secure surrounding that may assist them in a successful reintegration into the community.
Wis. ADMIN. CODE § [HSS] 306.01(l) (1987).
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not the prison generally. 170 Moreover, the court in its opinion incorrectly attrib-
utes the language of the administrative code provisions to the Wisconsin state
legislature 71 when, in fact, the provisions were promulgated by the Department
of Health and Social Services,' 7 2 the employer and defendant in this case.
First, the Torres court's approach to the essence factor clearly is more pas-
sive than the traditional approach discussed above. In cases such as Wilson v.
Southwest Airlines Co., 73 the courts have refused to accept the employer's sex-
based description of its business mission on face value. The fact that the em-
ployer in Wilson advertised its company as the "love airline" did not compel the
court in that case to accept the airline's discriminatory hiring policy as neces-
sary. Instead, the court in Wilson undertook an independent inquiry to deter-
mine the company's primary business function. 7 4 By allowing the employer in
Torres to create its own definition of normal business operations, the court sig-
nificantly lessens the burden of justifying a BFOQ and opens the door to the
possibility of pretextual bases for facial discrimination.
Second, both the Chambers and Torres courts effectively alter the eviden-
tiary requirements on the "all or substantially all" element. Both courts explic-
itly reject the need for employers to substantiate psychological BFOQs by pro-
ducing objective or empirical evidence.' 75 That much is not surprising; cases
based on a disparate impact theory have held that validation studies are not
always required to sustain employment practices. 78 But these cases go consider-
ably further. Neither court required the employer to justify the necessity of a
BFOQ classification by a preponderance of the evidence, expert or otherwise. In
Chambers, the court barely mentioned the expert testimony in support of the
role-model rule-a single sentence stating that the trial court "also relied in
part on expert testimony to the effect that the role-model rule could be helpful
in preventing teenage pregnancy.' ' 7 7 This was accompanied by a footnote indi-
cating that the parties' experts were in disagreement on this issue.'7 8 The princi-
pal basis for the court's finding of necessity appears instead to be the employer's
good faith belief in the efficacy of the rule.7 9
170. The second provision cited by the court is contained in a general statement on the applicability and
purposes of the prison rules. The text of this provision states:
The objectives of the disciplinary rules under this chapter [includes] the following . . .The rehabilitation
of inmates through the development of their ability to live with others, within the rules.
Wis ADMIN. CODE § [HSS] 303.01(3)(c) (1987).
171. See Torres, 859 F.2d at 1529-30.
172. See Wis. ADMIN. CODE §§ [HSSJ 303.01(3)(c) and 306.01 (1987).
173. 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
174. See id. at 302-04.
175. Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987); Torres v. Wisconsin Dep't of
Health and Social Servs., 859 F.2d 1523 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1017 (1989).
176. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 697 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1983).
177. Chambers. 834 F.2d at 702.
178. Id. at n.14.
179. See Id. at 701-02. Actually, the Chambers court never directly addressed the second element of the
BFOQ test at all. Since the court relied on business necessity grounds for establishing a BFOQ, the court never
discussed the elements of a separate BFOQ test. See Id. at 704. Even using this more lenient standard, it is
questionable whether the meager evidentiary record is sufficient to meet the usual requisites for establishing busi-
ness necessity. See Note, Discrimination Law-Impermissible Use of the Business Necessity Defense and the
Occupational Qualification, 12 W. NEw ENG. L. REV 135, 158-59 (1990).
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The use of evidence in Torres is even more telling. After concluding that
empirical evidence in support of the rehabilitation theory was both nonexistent
and not required,""0 the court made two points. First, the court stated that the
plaintiff's expert testimony was lacking in probative value. It was based on ex-
perts who had experience with male, but not female, institutions.18' Empirical
evidence to the effect that the recidivism rate had not diminished under the
female guard policy was discounted as lacking "any great relevance."18 Second,
the court went on to say that where empirical studies are not available, it may
be appropriate to defer to the employer's best business judgment. Here, the
judgment of the prison administrators was entitled to "substantial weight." 83
In essence, the Chambers and Torres courts establish a new formulation
governing the second BFOQ inquiry. In those instances in which it is difficult to
show by objective evidence that a discriminatory policy is reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of a business, the factfinder will defer to the judgment
of the employer. The burden of producing evidence showing that the discrimina-
tory policy is not reasonably necessary then shifts to the plaintiff challenging
the discriminatory practice. In Torres, for example, the evidence offered by the
plaintiffs was insufficient to rebut the employer's business judgment and the
BFOQ was allowed.' 8 '
As the dissenters in both Chambers85 and Torres8" noted, this reformula-
tion alters existing BFOQ law by shifting to the plaintiff the burden of produc-
ing evidence of the necessity of a sex-based practice. Admittedly, it is more
difficult to amass empirical evidence concerning a BFOQ based on psychological
needs than for a BFOQ based on the ability to lift heavy objects. Although this
may provide a reason not to require empirical evidence, 187 it does not justify
shifting the burden of producing other evidence, most notably expert psycholog-
ical testimony, away from the party that has adopted an employment practice
that excludes members of one sex.
The third element of the BFOQ test, the availability of less discriminatory
alternatives, was not so much altered as ignored. Although the dissenting opin-
ion in Chambers was "unimpressed" with the Club's reasons for rejecting alter-
natives short of firing the plaintiff, 88 at least the Chambers majority required a
consideration of possible alternatives. The court briefly discussed the feasibility
180. Torres, 859 F.2d at 1532.
181. Id.
182. Id. at n.4.
183. Id. at 1532.
184. Id.
185. Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697, 708 (McMillian, J., dissenting) ("Neither an em-
ployer's sincere belief, without more . . . that a discriminatory employment practice is related and necessary to
the accomplishments of the employer's goals is sufficient to establish a BFOQ or business necessity defense. The
fact that the goals are laudable and sincerely held does not substitute for data which demonstrate a relationship
between the discriminatory practice and the goals.").
186. Torres, 859 F.2d at 1533 (Cudahy, J., dissenting) ("[tlhe employer must establish the necessity of a
BFOQ in order to avoid Title vIls strictures against employment discrimination. For this case that rule means
that the burden of bridging the yawning gaps in our understanding of rehabilitation falls on the state, not the
plaintiffs.") (emphasis in original).
187. See id. at 1534.
188. Chambers, 834 F.2d at 708 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
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of alternative practices, such as a leave of absence or a transfer to a noncontact
position, but upheld the district court's determination that these were
unworkable.189
In Torres, the less discriminatory alternative factor was not even men-
tioned. This is surprising since the vast majority of prison guard cases following
Dothard have turned on the availability of less discriminatory alternatives.190
These cases consistently have invalidated policies excluding opposite sex guards
where selective work assignments could be used to accommodate the respective
interests at stake.1 ' As Judge Easterbrook emphasized in dissent, the TCI
guard policy stands as an anomaly in both practice and legality.192 Yet, the
Torres majority never discussed whether the rehabilitation goal could be served
by any means short of a blanket ban on male prison guards.
Added to these adjustments in the BFOQ test is the Chambers court's fail-
ure to apply the BFOQ test at all. The Eighth Circuit in Chambers decided that
the business necessity and BFOQ concepts were so similar that no independent
BFOQ inquiry was necessary. a93 Having found that business necessity dispelled
the disparate impact of the role-model rule, the court simply concluded that a
BFOQ also must exist to defeat the plaintiff's disparate treatment claim. 94 As
discussed in the context of the fetal-protection-policy cases in the following sec-
tion, equating the BFOQ defense with the traditionally broader business neces-
sity concept is inappropriate. 95 Nonetheless, the Torres court accomplishes
much the same result by recasting the BFOQ test in a much broader fashion.
Although arising in a somewhat different context, the Supreme Court has
cautioned against the use of a role-model theory to justify discriminatory em-
ployment practices. In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,98 the Supreme
Court struck down on equal protection grounds 97 a collective bargaining agree-
ment provision that gave a preference to minority public school teachers in
making layoffs. The lower courts had upheld the affirmative action policy on the
grounds that the school board had a legitimate interest in providing minority
role models in an attempt to alleviate the impact of societal discrimination. 8
189. Chambers, 834 F.2d at 702-03.
190. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
191. Id.
192. See Torres, 859 F.2d at 1536 (7th Cir. 1988) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). ("Women's prisons through-
out the nation employ male guards; other women's prisons in Wisconsin do so; four other courts of appeals have
held that unless prisons entail grave risks of violence to members of one sex only, as in Dothard, sex is not a bona
fide occupational qualification for the position of prison guard" [citations omitted]).
193. See Chambers, 834 F.2d at 704.
194. Id. at 704-05.
195. See infra notes 280-308 and accompanying text.
196. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
197. Arising in the public sector, the plaintiffs' claim of discrimination in Wygant was based on constitu-
tional grounds rather than Title V1l. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273. The equal protection grounds asserted by the
plaintiffs impose an even more stringent proscription against discrimination than does Title VI1. As the Wygant
Court stated, an employment preference based on racial considerations will be sustained under the equal protec-
tion clause only if "justified by compelling governmental interest." Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274. See also Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. I. 11 (1967).
198. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274. One of the negative impacts of societal discrimination, the district court
noted, was the fact that the percentage of minority teachers in the Jackson school system was less than the
percentage of minority students. Id.
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The Supreme Court rejected this role-model theory, which was not accompa-
nied by any showing of actual past discrimination by the school board, as "too
amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy."19 The Court ex-
plained that "the role model theory employed by the District Court has no logi-
cal stopping point. The role model theory allows the Board to engage in discrim-
inatory hiring and layoff practices long past the point required by any
legitimate remedial purpose." 200
The Supreme Court's admonition in Wygant is relevant in the BFOQ con-
text. As in Wygant, acceptance of a role-model BFOQ has the effect of legaliz-
ing otherwise discriminatory conduct. The role-model theory utilized in Cham-
bers and Torres is similarly "amorphous" in that both courts recognize the
inability to substantiate the need for these psychologically-based employment
policies by empirical or other objective evidence.201 More significantly, the role
model BFOQ also has "no logical stopping point" if an employer can adopt
such a policy without either establishing a need for excluding members of the
opposite sex or undertaking a serious consideration of less discriminatory
alternatives.
The point is not that the specific holdings in either Chambers or Torres are
necessarily wrong. It may well be that the exclusion of single, pregnant instruc-
tors is necessary to the successful operations of the Omaha Girl's Club. It may
also be, although less likely, that the exclusion of all male guards from
Taycheedah Correctional Institute is necessary to further the rehabilitation of
the female inmates. 20 2 The point is really this-the Chambers and Torres deci-
sions have significantly expanded the perimeter of the BFOQ test to the point
that it may now be possible to establish a BFOQ defense even though not "rea-
sonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business."
3. A Proposal
The role-model cases are difficult, and the principal problem is one of
proof. An employer's claim of a BFOQ because of the psychological needs of its
clientele is clearly less susceptible of objective proof than a BFOQ based on
physical or safety concerns. Nonetheless, the Chambers and Torres courts take
a wrong turn in responding to the problem by simply deferring to the em-
ployer's business judgment. Title VII's ban on sex discrimination requires that a
role-model exception be substantiated as "reasonably necessary." Rather than
199. Id. at 276.
200. Id. at 275.
201. See supra notes 175-87 and accompanying text.
202. One commentator maintains that the result in Torres was appropriate as a means of redressing gender
inequality. See Note, Title VII-Bona Fide Occupational Defense-Necessity of Sex Discriminatory Policy
Should be Evaluated According to a Totality of the Circumstances Test, 102 HARV. L. REV. 2048 (1989). The
author acknowledges that Torres "expanded the discretion of employers to implement gender discriminatory poli-
cies [while] fail[ing] to establish safeguards to ensure that such policies will promote legitimate goals." Id. at
2051. The note suggests that gender-based policies are appropriate where necessary to rectify the sexual domina-
tion of women, but not to uphold policies that merely exclude women. Id. at 2053. Even under this standard,
however, the Torres court failed to require an evidentiary basis for concluding that the exclusion of male guards
was necessary to redress sexual inequality.
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abdicating their responsibilities, the courts should test a role model BFOQ by
the same standard used in other cases, but adjusted by some fine tuning for the
difficulty of proof.
First, the courts should ascertain whether psychological role modeling goes
to the essence of the employer's business. In making this determination, some
deference is due the employer. It is, after all, the employer's business. But the
courts should not follow Torres in automatically deferring to the employer's
characterization of its business mission. The employer, instead, should be re-
quired to produce evidence establishing that psychological role modeling goes to
the core of its business, and the plaintiff should have the opportunity to rebut
this showing. Most importantly, the courts should weigh this evidence on an
independent basis.
Second, the employer must establish that the exclusion of one sex is neces-
sary to accomplish the psychological business objective. Because of the relative
difficulty of proof, objective evidence should not be required. The employer,
however, should be required to support its policy by the best evidence availa-
ble-usually expert psychological testimony. 203 And the burden of proof on this
issue should be on the party attempting to justify the sex-based practice.
Finally, the employer also should bear the burden of proving the absence of
less discriminatory alternatives. This is likely to be the most significant issue in
many psychological cases because it is one issue on which tangible, nonexpert
evidence is likely to be possible. Unlike in Chambers and Torres, the courts
should make this a real, rather than a perfunctory, inquiry.
This proposed framework more appropriately balances the respective con-
cerns of the parties. The difficulty of proof problem is ameliorated by providing
some deference to the employer's description of its business mission and by dis-
pensing with the requirement of objective proof. At the same time, the BFOQ
defense is narrowly limited to ensure that a psychological justification for an
otherwise discriminatory policy will only be permitted when "reasonably
necessary."
B. Fetal Protection and the Rise of Business Necessity
The second line of BFOQ expansion has occurred in cases addressing the
validity of fetal protection policies. Three courts of appeals have held that fetal
protection policies may constitute a valid basis for excluding female employees
from the workplace. These fetal protection decisions are a new twist on the
previously recognized safety grounds for a BFOQ.
203. This proposal is consistent with the guidelines contained in the EEOC Compliance Manual for estab-
lishing a "same-sex role model" BFOQ. To substantiate such a BFOQ, the Manual requires
medical evidence from the employer that the employer's clients have psychological need for a same-sex
role model. This evidence is the main element in the same-sex role model investigation and must be in the
form of a written statement or affidavit provided by a doctor, psychiatrist, or psychologist.
EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 625.8(a)(2), at 625:0017 (April 1982).
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The Supreme Court's Dothard204 decision established the ground rules for
a safety-based BFOQ. In that case, the Court upheld a BFOQ for male prison
guards in Alabama's "peculiarly inhospitable" maximum security prison for
men. The Court was not concerned with the danger facing the individual prison
guard. The Court stressed that Title VII does not permit an employer to pre-
sume that a job is too dangerous for women. The issue of personal danger is a
choice left to the individual employee or applicant. 0 The Dothard Court was
concerned, instead, with whether the presence of female guards would under-
mine the ability to carry out the essential task of maintaining prison security.2 06
The lesson of Dothard is that a BFOQ based on safety grounds is appropriate
only where the exclusion of one sex is necessary to accomplish the performance
of the employer's primary business function.20 7
Subsequent cases have strictly limited the results in Dothard to the partic-
ular facts of Alabama's dormitory-style prison setting.208 No reported decision
since Dothard has sustained a BFOQ for prison guards on safety grounds. In
fact, the Torres209 decision is the only case since Dothard to recognize a BFOQ
for prison guards on any basis whatsoever.
The only post-Dothard cases recognizing a BFOQ because of safety have
involved concerns related to pregnancy. These cases fall into two categories. The
first category is similar to Dothard in that the safety concern focuses on the
ability to carry out essential job functions. For example, a number of cases have
recognized BFOQ's for nonpregnant flight attendants because of the fear that
pregnancy would interfere with the attendants' ability to carry out passenger
safety functions in emergency situations.21 0 Like Dothard, this fear goes to the
core of an employee's capability of performing an essential job function: the
safe transportation of airline passengers. The principal issues posed in these
cases are whether BFOQ exclusions can be avoided either by individual test-
ing21' or by the adoption of less discriminatory alternatives.2 2 Thus, this first
line of cases closely follow the traditional limits of the BFOQ test.
The second line of cases is very different. Here, the focus is not on job
performance but on the potential for harm to an employee's fetus or offspring.
Three recent courts of appeals decisions have held that the exclusion of fertile
women from the workplace may be justified in situations where employment
may pose a danger to fetal health. These decisions represent a potentially large
204. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). The Dothard decision is discussed in more detail supra
notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
205. Id. at 335.
206. Id. at 336.
207. See Becker, supra note 121, at 1253 ("the 'safety exception' has been limited to instances in which sex
or pregnancy actually interferes with the employee's ability to perform the job").
208. See M. PLAYER, supra note 12 at 287.
209. Torres v. Wis. Dep't. of Health and Social Servs., 859 F.2d 1523 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 1133 (1989).
210. See, e.g., Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1984); Harriss v. Pan Am World
Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980); Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980).
211. See, e.g., Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 372 (1980) (majority opinion concluding
that maternity leave issue cannot be determined on an individual basis, but dissenting opinion would require
individual evaluation of ability to perform. Id. at 374 (Butzner, J., dissenting)).
212. See, e.g., Levin, 730 F.2d at 999-1002.
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departure from traditional BFOQ principles in that they reject the need for
BFOQ analysis in favor of the broader business necessity theory in testing the
validity of facially discriminatory employment practices.
1. The Fetal Protection Cases
In Wright v. Olin Corp.,2 a the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals considered
the validity of a fetal protection policy that excluded fertile women from jobs
requiring exposure to potentially harmful chemicals. The Wright court con-
fronted a dilemma similar to that of the Eighth Circuit in Chambers-the lower
court decision was obviously in error but the appeals court was sympathetic to
the result. The district court decision in Wright had upheld Olin's policy, find-
ing that it was not adopted with a discriminatory purpose, but without consider-
ing whether the policy was facially discriminatory or had a discriminatory im-
pact. The court never reached the BFOQ issue.214 Unfortunately, the Fourth
Circuit emulated the Chambers court and retained the result by compounding
the error.
The Wright court had considerable difficulty in determining the appropri-
ate conceptual framework for its analysis. The problem centered around
whether the plaintiff's claim was grounded in a disparate treatment or a dispa-
rate impact theory, the court noting that fetal protection policies do not fit
neatly into either of these categories. 15 Prior to the adoption of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act (PDA) of 1978,216 the Supreme Court had ruled that em-
ployment practices based on pregnancy were not facially discriminatory and
could only be challenged under a disparate impact theory.217 The PDA altered
this result four years prior to the Wright decision by amending Title VII to
provide that pregnancy-based distinctions constitute per se acts of sex discrimi-
nation.218 The Wright court, however, failed to discuss the PDA and relied on
the pre-amendment line of cases to conclude that the fetal protection policy
should be analyzed under a disparate impact/business necessity approach.219
The court in Wright apparently knew that its disparate impact conclusion
was on shaky grounds and attempted to fashion an alternative basis for avoiding
the narrow strictures of the BFOQ defense. The court acknowledged that the
facial neutrality of Olin's policy "might be subject to logical dispute," but dis-
missed that concern as "semantic quibbling. ' 220 The court emphasized that the
Title VII theories were not "intended to operate with rigid precision." 221 Al-
213. 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
214. Id. at 1182-84.
215. Id. at 1184.
216. Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978).
217. See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977); General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125
(1976).
218. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988). See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S.
669, 684 (1983) (stating that the amendment "has now made clear that, for all Title VII purposes, discrimination
based on a woman's pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because of her sex."). See also supra note 131.
219. Wright, 697 F.2d at 1186.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1184.
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though the generally accepted notion that the BFOQ is the appropriate defense
to excuse otherwise overt discrimination is "properly descriptive of a paradig-
matic litigation pattern, it is not an accurate statement of any inherent con-
straints in Title VII doctrine. ' 2 2 The real appropriate defense, the court ex-
plained in a footnote, is a matter of litigation choice:
In this case, where the defendant-employer has not attempted to present a classic
b.f.o.q. defense, it may not properly be forced to do so. We therefore reject claimant's
suggestion that because the claim of violation here is arguably one of "overt" discrimi-
nation, the employer is confined to a b.f.o.q. defense that obviously cannot be estab-
lished and indeed is not advanced. Instead defendant is entitled to have consid-
ered-though not necessarily to have accepted-the defense actually advanced under
the wider scope of the business necessity theory. 23
Thus, according to the Wright court, the employer must be entitled to assert a
business necessity defense, regardless of the nature of the plaintiff's claim, be-
cause otherwise it would lose.
Applying the disparate impact/business necessity approach, the court first
held that the fetal vulnerability program constituted a prima facie case of sex
discrimination.22 The court then attempted to adapt the traditional business
necessity defense to fetal protection programs. As a threshold question, the
court considered whether the protection of workers' unborn children could prop-
erly be considered a "necessity. '225 The court noted that protecting the safety of
workers' unborn children conceptually lies somewhere between protecting the
safety of the workers themselves and protecting the safety of customers exposed
to workplace hazards. 2 6 The court concluded that the safety of unborn children
is sufficiently analogous to the safety of customers to qualify potentially as a
business necessity22 7 and remanded the business necessity issue to the district
court for further proceedings.
As a guide to the district court, the Wright court outlined its idea of the
appropriate analysis to be followed in fetal protection cases. The court first
stated that an employer must prove that significant risks of harm to unborn
children make necessary the exclusion of women, and not men, from hazardous
work areas.2 28 The employer must establish the significance and extent of the
risk as well as the necessity of the program by independent, objective evidence,
including expert opinion evidence. 2 The business necessity defense is prima
facie established at this point.230 A plaintiff, however, may rebut the business
need by showing the availability of less discriminatory means of achieving the
employer's desired goal.23 1
222. Id. at 1186, n.21.
223. Id. The Wright court does not explain why a defendant would ever choose to rely on a narrow BFOQ
defense rather than a broad business necessity defense.
224. Id. at 1187.
225. Id. at 1188.
226. Id. at 1189.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1190.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1191.
231. Id.
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Two years later, the Eleventh Circuit in Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospi-
tal considered the validity of a hospital's fetal protection policy which resulted
in the firing of a pregnant x-ray technician.2 32 The hospital-employer discharged
the technician "to protect the pregnant employee's fetus from potentially harm-
ful radiation and to protect the hospital's finances from potential litigation. '2 33
The Eleventh Circuit adopted a somewhat different approach than did the
Wright court. As an initial point of departure, the Hayes court acknowledged
that the adoption of the PDA requires that the disparate treatment theory must
be considered in evaluating fetal protection policies.2 34 The Eleventh Circuit
nonetheless borrowed heavily from Wright in constructing its own analytical
framework.23 5
The Hayes court began by establishing a presumption that if an employer's
policy applies only to pregnant women, it is facially discriminatory and subject
to scrutiny under a disparate treatment/BFOQ analysis. 23 In spite of the PDA,
the Hayes court permitted an employer to rebut this presumption by showing
that the policy is neutral in the sense that it "effectively and equally protects
the offspring of all employees. 2 37 Specifically, the employer must show (1) that
there is a substantial risk of harm to the fetus from the woman's exposure to
workplace hazards, and (2) that the hazard applies only to women and not to
men.238 In both cases, scientific evidence is necessary.23
If the employer demonstrates the existence of these two factors, the Hayes
court considers the policy facially neutral and a disparate impact/business ne-
cessity standard applies.240 If the employer fails to overcome the burden of
showing that its policy is not facially discriminatory, the plaintiff's disparate
treatment claim prevails unless the employer establishes a BFOQ defense.241
The court explained, consistent with traditional BFOQ principles, that a BFOQ
exists only if the employer can show a direct relationship between the policy
and the ability of pregnant or fertile women to perform the job.242
Applying this mode of analysis to the instant case, the court concluded that
the hospital failed to demonstrate that the level of radiation exposure presented
an unreasonable risk of harm to the fetus.243 Thus, the hospital did not rebut
the presumption of facial discrimination and a disparate treatment violation was
established.244 No BFOQ defense was available since the hospital failed to prove
that the employee's pregnancy would somehow affect her job performance.245
232. 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984).
233. Id. at 1546.
234. Id. at 1547-48.
235. See id. at 1548, n.8.
236. Id. at 1548.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1552.
241. Id. at 1549.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1550-51.
244. Id. at 1551-52.
245. Id.
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Although it concluded that the facts were sufficient to sustain a finding of
facial discrimination, the court, to "be completely fair to the Hospital," also
analyzed the policy under a disparate impact theory. 246 Pursuant to the court's
analytical model, the business necessity defense is automatically established by
the same factors that rebut the presumption of facial discrimination.24 ' The
burden then shifts to the employee to show the existence of "acceptable alterna-
tive policies that would have a lesser impact on the affected sex."' 24 8 The Hayes
court concluded that the hospital would also lose under this theory because it
failed to consider less discriminatory alternatives to firing the pregnant
technician. 249
Interestingly, neither of these first two cases actually sustained a fetal pro-
tection policy.250 The Wright court remanded the issue of business necessity to
the lower court while the Eleventh Circuit in Hayes found the hospital's policy
unlawful. The only court of appeals decision that has upheld a fetal protection
policy under Title VII is the Seventh Circuit's decision in UAW v. Johnson
Controls, Inc.,251 which one of the dissenting judges described as "likely the
most important sex-discrimination case in any court since . . . Congress en-
acted Title VII. 252
In 1982, Johnson Controls, a manufacturer of batteries, adopted a fetal
protection policy designed to protect unborn children and their mothers from
harmful lead exposure. 253 The policy excludes women of presumed childbearing
age from jobs in which lead levels are considered excessive.25 ' Johnson Controls
maintained that this policy was necessary because the previous voluntary policy
failed to adequately protect pregnant women and their unborn children. 255
The Seventh Circuit considered the validity of Johnson Controls' policy in
the procedural context of reviewing the district court's grant of Johnson Con-
trols' summary judgment motion which upheld the policy on the merits. 258 The
Seventh Circuit affirmed in a 7-4 en banc decision.25 7
246. See id. at 1552-54.
247. Id. at 1553. While the Hayes court found that the hospital's desire to protect the health of employee
offspring established a business necessity, it rejected the hospital's alternative contention that potential litigation
costs can provide the basis for a business necessity defense. Id. n.15. The court stated that potential liability is
"too contingent and too broad a factor to amount to a 'business necessity."' Id.
248. Id. at 1554.
249. Id. at 1553-54.
250. The Fifth Circuit also invalidated a pre-PDA fetal protection policy relied on to support the firing of a
pregnant x-ray technician on the grounds that the employer-hospital had failed to use available, less discrimina-
tory alternatives to discharge. See Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hospital, 692 F.2d 986, 992 (5th Cir. 1982).
251. 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 59 U.S.L.W. 4209 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1991) (No. 89-1215). See also
Comment, Title VII-Equal Employment Opportunity-Seventh Circuit Upholds Employer's Fetal Protection
Plan, 103 HARV. L. REv. 977 (1990) (discussing the Johnson Controls decision).
252. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 920 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 874.
254. Id. at 876. The policy presumes that any woman under age 70 is fertile, see id. at 907 (Posner, J.,
dissenting), but does not apply to those females who provide medical confirmation of their inability to bear chil-
dren, id. at 877-78.
255. Id. at 878.
256. See UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Wis. 1988).
257. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 59 U.S.L.W. 4209 (U.S. Mar. 20,
1991) (No. 89-1215).
[Vol. 52:5
BFOQ REVISITED: JOHNSON CONTROLS
The Johnson Controls court followed the lead of Wright and Hayes in
adopting a business necessity framework for testing the validity of fetal protec-
tion policies. 258 Although apparently acknowledging that such a policy consti-
tutes facial discrimination normally justifiable only by a BFOQ defense, 59 the
court stressed the "necessity of avoiding rigid application of proof patterns to
particular factual situations."2 60 After reviewing the Wright and Hayes deci-
sions, as well as an EEOC Policy Statement261 summarizing these two decisions,
the Johnson Controls court formulated a three-part test for establishing the
business necessity defense. Under this approach, a fetal protection policy will
survive a Title VII challenge if (1) there is a substantial health risk to the
unborn child; (2) the transmission occurs only through women; and (3) no
equally effective, less discriminatory alternatives are available to the
employer. 262
The court also discussed the burden of proof allocation rules outlined for
disparate impact cases in the Supreme Court's Wards Cove decision.2 63 In
Wards Cove, the Court held that while an employer carries the burden of pro-
ducing evidence of a business justification, the burden of persuasion on this is-
sue remains with the plaintiff. 64 The Johnson Controls court adopted this ap-
proach as well. Accordingly, the question posed by the Johnson Controls court,
given the summary judgment posture, was whether the plaintiffs presented suffi-
cient evidence to demonstrate that the business necessity defense must fail. 265
In applying this analytical framework, the court first stated that both par-
ties were in agreement that the record contained adequate evidence concerning
the existence of substantial health risks to the unborn child.266 The court then
went on to conclude that the plaintiffs had failed to show that the risk of trans-
mission is not confined to women and that there are less discriminatory alterna-
tives available.267 Since the plaintiffs had not met their burden of proof on the
business necessity issue, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's grant of
summary judgment.2 68
The court also determined that Johnson's policy could be upheld even
under a more narrow BFOQ analysis.2 9 The Seventh Circuit relied heavily on
its earlier Torres270 decision in reaching this conclusion. As in Torres, the John-
son Controls court defined the employer's business essence with particularity
and concluded that Johnson Controls' concern for industrial safety was part of
258. Id. at 886.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 883.
261. EEOC Policy Statement on Reproductive and Fetal Hazards Under Title Vi, Fair Empl. Prac. Man.
(BNA) 401:6013 (Oct. 3, 1988).
262. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 885.
263. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989). The Wards Cove decision is discussed
supra at notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
264. See Id. at 2126.
265. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 888.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 889-91.
268. Id. at 893.
269. Id.
270. The Torres decision is discussed supra notes 156-67 and accompanying text.
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the "essence" of the company's battery manufacturing business."' The court
also followed Torres in providing considerable deference to the employer's busi-
ness judgment and finding that Johnson Controls' policy was reasonably neces-
sary to furthering the industrial safety objective.27 2
Four dissenting judges filed three separate opinions. All agreed that John-
son Controls' fetal protection policy constituted disparate treatment which may
be excused only by the employer's proof of a BFOQ.2 7 3 One dissenting judge
denounced the substitution of a business necessity standard as simply "result[s]-
oriented gimmickry. 217 4
The dissenters disagreed, however, as to the proper scope of the BFOQ
defense as applied in a fetal protection case. Judge Easterbrook argued for the
traditional, narrow construction. Applying this approach, he concluded that the
Johnson Controls policy could not satisfy the BFOQ standard because the em-
ployer's concern for fetal health is unrelated to the normal operation of the
battery manufacturing business and because not all or substantially all women
employees will become pregnant.27 5 Noting that Johnson Controls' policy was
more stringent than that required by OSHA, Judge Easterbrook also concluded
that the lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer was
inappropriate even under a business necessity analysis. 76
Judge Posner also contended that it was a mistake to decide such impor-
tant policy issues in the context of a summary judgment motion.277 While
agreeing with Judge Easterbrook that a discriminatory treatment/BFOQ analy-
sis was required, Judge Posner argued for a more expansive interpretation of
the BFOQ defense. He maintained that the "normal operation" of a business,
within the meaning of the BFOQ defense, "encompasses ethical, legal and busi-
ness concerns about the effects of an employer's activities on third parties,"
including the impact of exposing employee offspring to excessive amounts of
lead.217 8 Judge Posner would remand this case for a full-blown trial to address a
"host of unanswered questions" such as the feasibility of alternative practices,
the potential hazard posed to the fetus by paternal lead exposure, and the finan-
cial impact of potential litigation.27
9
2. The Fetal Protection Policy Expansion Critiqued
The expansion accomplished by the fetal protection cases is more similar to
that in Chambers than in Torres. In the Torres decision,2 80 the Eighth Circuit
utilized the elements of the traditional BFOQ test but adjusted them to increase
271. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 896.
272. Id. at 896-98.
273. Id. at 902 (Cudahy, J., dissenting), 904 (Posner, J., dissenting), and 908 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
274. Id. at 902 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
275. Id. at 912-15 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (Judge Flaum joined in Judge Easterbrook's dissent).
276. Id. at 915-20.
277. Id. at 902 (Posner, J., dissenting).
278. Id. at 904-06. Judge Cudahy, in a separate opinion, notes his agreement with Judge Posner's more
expansive approach. Id. at 901 n.1 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
279. Id. at 906-07.
280. The Torres decision is discussed supra notes 156-67 and accompanying text.
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the scope of judicial deference to managerial decision-making. The fetal protec-
tion cases, in contrast, reject the BFOQ test entirely and substitute the broader
business necessity standard. This approach is similar to Chambers but with one
important distinction. The rejection of the BFOQ test in Chambers was appar-
ently a mistake. 281 In the fetal protection cases, the choice was very deliberate.
The business necessity standard used in the fetal protection cases is clearly
broader than the traditional BFOQ test. While the latter defense is usually lim-
ited to ascertaining gender attributes that preclude effective job performance,
the business necessity concept encompasses broader concerns including work-
place safety.2 82 In fact, the Wright court, in adopting a business necessity ap-
proach, expressly stated that the fetal protection policy at issue could not stand
if tested under a BFOQ standard.283
The substitution of a business necessity standard for the traditional BFOQ
test in disparate treatment cases is not only contrary to longstanding precedent,
but also is inappropriate as a matter of policy. Until Wright, it was universally
accepted that disparate treatment cases required a BFOQ justification while the
business necessity standard was applicable only in cases of disparate impact.284
This distinction flows naturally from the origin of the two concepts. The
BFOQ defense is statutory in nature and part of Title VII as originally en-
acted.285 By its terms, the defense justifies overt discrimination on the basis of
religion, sex or national origin when "reasonably necessary to the normal opera-
tion of that particular business. ' 286 Business necessity, on the other hand, is a
judicially-created concept. Its origin in the seminal Supreme Court case of
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.287 is in the very same paragraph that gave birth to
the notion of a Title VII cause of action grounded in disparate impact: "The
Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in
form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If
an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to
be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited. 288
More significantly, these two theories perform very different functions. A
BFOQ is an affirmative defense to conduct that is overtly discriminatory. It is
not part of the McDonnell Douglas framework for proving discrimination. 289 A
BFOQ defense comes into play only after conduct has already been proven or
admitted to be discriminatory. The function of the BFOQ defense, then, is to
permit an employer to adopt a sex-based policy that would otherwise be illegal.
Business necessity, in contrast, is not really a defense at all, but part of the
evidentiary framework for proving a case of disparate impact.290 While the
281. See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 41-56 and accompanying text.
283. Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1185 n.21 (1982).
284. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
285. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(e), 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
286. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (1988).
287. 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
288. Id. (emphasis added).
289. The McDonnell Douglas framework for proving discrimination and its relationship to the BFOQ de-
fense is explained supra, notes 28-32 and 37-40 and accompanying text.
290. See M. PLAYER, supra note 12, at 279, 282.
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BFOQ defense presumes discriminatory conduct but attempts to justify it, busi-
ness necessity arises at an earlier step as part of the process of determining
whether conduct is discriminatory in the first place.
The challenged employment practice in a disparate impact case is facially
neutral in that it does not differentiate on the basis of sex. Business necessity
comes into play only if the practice has a disproportionate effect on members of
one sex. As the Griggs Court explained, business necessity is the analytical
"touchstone" for testing whether a facially neutral policy with a statistically
imbalanced impact is discriminatory within the meaning of Title VII.2 91 The
role of business necessity, then, is to determine whether an otherwise nondis-
criminatory policy serves a legitimate employment-related purpose so as to dis-
sipate the inference of discrimination raised by virtue of the practice's dispro-
portionate impact.2 92
This distinction is crucial. One theory justifies overt discrimination. The
other theory assists in determining whether facially neutral policies have an un-
acceptable impact on members of one sex or are appropriately related to legiti-
mate business purposes. Regardless of the labels attached to these theories, the
former necessarily must be more circumscribed in scope.
Take, for example, the case of a firefighter position. The Fire Chief has a
legitimate interest in filling the position with an employee who has the strength
and endurance to perform essential fire fighting tasks. A classic case of dispa-
rate treatment occurs if the Chief presumes that women as a class are incapable
of performing these duties and adopts a male-only hiring policy. On the other
hand, the Chief may screen applicants by testing for strength and endurance. A
prima facie case of disparate impact arises if this test disqualifies more women
than men.
These two scenarios require two functionally different methods of analysis.
The former exclusionary policy, based as it is on stereotyped characterizations,
is clearly more offensive to the policies underlying Title VII.293 The blanket
exclusion of all women applicants, as a matter of policy, should be allowed only
if absolutely necessary to the performance of essential job duties, i.e., if the
BFOQ test is established. The strength and endurance test, however, warrants a
different approach. The test does not exclude women as a class. Even if the test
operates so as to exclude a higher percentage of female applicants, this does not
necessarily offend Title VII's goal of equal treatment.294 The pertinent issue in
this disparate impact context is whether the strength and endurance test is ap-
propriately tailored to screen for necessary job skills. In other words, the
291. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
292. See Comment, supra note 41 at 933-34.
293. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335, n.15 (1977) (the explicit consideration of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin in making employment decisions "was the most obvious evil Congress had in
mind when it enacted Title VII"); see also Note, Discrimination Law-Impermissible Use of the Business Neces-
sMy Defense and the Occupational Qualification, 12 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 135, 162-63 (1990) (the greater
culpability inherent in intentional as opposed to unintentional discrimination requires a narrower reading of the
exception in the former context).
294. See Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. Cm. L. REV. 235, 265-81 (1971).
[Vol. 52:5
BFOQ REVISITED: JOHNSON CONTROLS
facially neutral test should be found discriminatory only if it fails the more
lenient business necessity standard.
The Supreme Court has recognized this hierarchy of culpability with re-
spect to disparate treatment and disparate impact claims in two recent decisions
clarifying burden of proof rules. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,295 the Court
addressed the burden of proof allocation in a mixed-motive, disparate treatment
case. The plaintiff in such a case establishes a prima facie violation by showing
that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision even though
another, nondiscriminatory reason may also have been a factor.298 The Court
explained that the burden of proof then shifts to the employer to show that it
would have reached the same decision in the absence of the discriminatory
factor.29 7
In contrast, the Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,2 8
held that the burden of proof in a disparate impact case remains with the plain-
tiff at all times, including the business necessity stage. Even after a prima facie
case has been established, the employer's burden is only that of producing evi-
dence of a business justification to support the challenged practice.29 9
Justice O'Connor, in a concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse,0 0 ex-
plained this distinction in burden of proof rules in terms of a "presumption of
good faith."30 1 Once overt discrimination is shown to exist, even in part, the
employer is not "entitled to the same presumption of good faith concerning its
employment decisions which is accorded employers facing only circumstantial
evidence of discrimination." 30 2 In this setting, it is appropriate for the employer
to convince the factfinder that "despite the smoke, there is no fire." 30 3 Directly
comparing the two types of claims, Justice O'Connor stated:
I believe there are significant differences between shifting the burden of persuasion to
the employer in a case resting purely on statistical proof as in the disparate impact
setting and shifting the burden of persuasion in a case like this one, where an em-
ployee has demonstrated by direct evidence that an illegitimate factor played a sub-
stantial role in a particular employment decision. First, the explicit consideration of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in making employment decisions "was the
most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII . . ." Second,
shifting the burden of persuasion to the employer in a situation like this one creates no
incentive to preferential treatment ...the employer need not seek racial or sexual
balance in its work force; rather, all it need do is avoid substantial reliance on forbid-
den criteria in making its employment decisions.3 0'
These burden of proof rules underscore yet another reason for not substi-
tuting a business necessity standard in disparate treatment cases. While a
295. 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989). The Price Waterhouse decision is discussed supra notes 30 and 35.
296. Id. at 1785.
297, Id. at 1787-88.
298, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2126 (1989). The Wards Cove decision is discussed supra at notes 49-53 and accompa-
nying text.
299. Id.
300. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1798-1801 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
301. Id.
302, Id. at 1798-99.
303. Id. at 1799.
304. Id. at 1803-04.
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BFOQ is an affirmative defense that the employer must establish 30 5 the Wards
Cove decision places the burden of persuasion in disparate impact cases on the
plaintiff.308 The Seventh Circuit in Johnson Controls incorporated the Wards
Cove burden of proof standard along with its use of the business necessity the-
ory. Thus, the Johnson Controls court affirmed the grant of summary judgment
for the employer because the plaintiff failed to prove that paternal exposure to
lead can also pose a danger to offspring and that feasible alternatives exist to
excluding fertile women from the workplace.3 17 As Judge Easterbrook noted in
dissent, this application of Wards Cove further waters down the already lenient
approach of the Wright and Hayes courts, both of which had assumed that the
employer at least bore the burden of establishing business necessity.308 Unfortu-
nately, the combination of substituting a business necessity test for the tradi-
tional BFOQ defense and placing the burden on the plaintiff to establish the
lack of business necessity transforms a narrow exception to the ban on sex dis-
crimination into a virtual, and contrary, presumption.
3. Correcting the Course
The substitution of a business necessity standard has also met with recent
criticism from more official sources. Within the first ten months following the
release of the Johnson Controls opinion, the EEOC and two court decisions
took positions expressly disagreeing with the Seventh Circuit's approach.
The Seventh Circuit's use of the Wards Cove burden of proof rules has led
the EEOC to issue a new Policy Guide disagreeing with the Johnson Controls
decision.309 In retreating from a previously issued interim Policy Statement that
adhered to the Wright-Hayes business necessity analysis in fetal protection
cases,310 the EEOC stated:
In its interim guidance, the Commission did not contemplate the Seventh Circuit's
application of the Wards Cove business necessity standard, imposing on the plaintiff
the burden of disproving business necessity. The court's approach represents a signifi-
cant departure from the analytical framework previously developed by the courts and
endorsed by the Commission. . . . For the plaintiff to bear the burden of proof in a
case in which there is direct evidence of facially discriminatory policy is wholly incon-
sistent with settled Title VII law.311
The Policy Guide goes on to state that "[g]iven the Seventh Circuit's uncritical
application of the Wards Cove adverse impact burdens to a factually distinct
claim of facial discrimination, we now think BFOQ is the better approach."312
305. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
306. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2126 (1989).
307. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 889-92 (7th Cir. 1989).
308. Id. at 915 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). It should be noted that both Wright and Hayes were decided
prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove.
309. EEOC Policy Guide N-915-047, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 405:6797 (Jan. 24, 1990) (hereinafter
"EEOC Policy Guide (1990)").
310. EEOC Policy Statement n.915.034, I EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) N:3711 (Oct. 7, 1988) (policy Guid-
ance on Reproductive and Fetal Hazards).
311. EEOC Policy Guide (1990), supra note 309, at 6799.
312. Id. at 6800.
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The BFOQ standard endorsed by the EEOC more closely resembles that
suggested by Judge Posner. 13 The EEOC Policy Guide states that the BFOQ
defense in fetal protection cases may permissibly encompass concerns for the
health of employee offspring, even if not directly related to job performance
itself 314 Nonetheless, the Policy Guide stresses that the application of the
BFOQ defense must be quite narrow in scope. The Policy Guide explicitly di-
rects field offices not to rely on Johnson Controls for guidance and criticizes
that decision for giving "undue deference to the employer's judgment in broadly
drawing its exclusionary policy."3 15 The EEOC instead adopts the traditional
three-prong BFOQ test with the employer bearing the burden of proof on each
element.316 The Policy Guide particularly emphasizes that an employer at-
tempting to justify a fetal protection policy that excludes female employees
must prove that it similarly protects the offspring of male employees from anal-
ogous risks and that its policy is as narrowly tailored as possible.31, 7
A California court of appeals has also rejected the use of the business ne-
cessity standard in fetal protection cases. In Johnson Controls 11,318 the validity
of Johnson Controls policy was again at issue, this time under California law.
The California court affirmed the findings of the California Fair Employment
and Housing Commission and invalidated the policy under a disparate treat-
ment/BFOQ analysis. Although noting the similarities between Title VII and
the applicable California statute,3 1 9 the court rejected the Seventh Circuit's ap-
proach as an inappropriate "twist[ing]" of the requisite BFOQ standard.3 20
The California court initially explained that, a "possibility of pregnancy"
criterion, as a basis for refusing to hire female employees, constitutes overt gen-
der discrimination. 21 The court then carefully reviewed the "distinct conceptual
bases" of the BFOQ and business necessity theories and held that the legality of
overtly discriminatory practices must be scrutinized under a BFOQ standard. 22
The California court cautioned that:
[t]he fact that it may be difficult for the employer to meet the BFOQ standard in an
FPP situation is a concern of the Legislature. This court should not misconstrue the
plain import of the law to solve a problem the legislative branch would have addressed
if it were omniscient.323
The California court concluded that Johnson Controls failed to establish
the elements of the BFOQ defense. The court held that the employer failed to
show that fertile women cannot effectively perform the jobs in question, thereby
adopting Judge Easterbrook's narrow construction of the "business essence" ele-
313. See Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 903 (Posner, J., dissenting).
314. See EEOC Policy Guide (1990), supra note 309, at 6801.
315. Id. at 6803-04.
316. Id. at 6802.
317. Id. at 6801-02.
318. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. California Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 218 Cal. App. 3d 517, 267
Cal. Rptr. 158 (1990).
319. Id. at 539, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
320. Id. at 546, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
321. Id. at 533, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 166.
322. See id. at 540-41, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 170-71.
323. Id. at 544, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
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ment.324 The court also ruled that Johnson Controls did not demonstrate that
"all or substantially all" women workers posed a risk of potential fetal harm.
The fact that some women may become pregnant, the court noted, does not
justify the exclusion of female employees as a class.825
The court placed special emphasis on the fact that Johnson Controls' policy
was in conflict with applicable OSHA regulations in two respects.3 2 First, the
threshold level of impermissible lead exposure is more stringent under the John-
son Controls' policy.327 Second, and more significantly, the pertinent OSHA
standard specifically rejects the need for treating male and female employees
differently because of procreation concerns. 28 The court observed that OSHA
findings reject the claim that lead poses a greater harm to the reproductive
capacities of women than men.329
Most recently, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals also rejected the use of a
business necessity standard in testing the validity of a fetal protection policy. In
Grant v. General Motors Corp.,330 a female employee at General Motors' Cen-
tral Foundry facility in Ohio was reassigned to a lower paying job in accordance
with the company's fetal protection policy. This policy bans all fertile women
from jobs in foundry areas with air lead levels in excess of 30 micrograms of
lead per cubic meter of air. 31 In resolving the employee's sex discrimination
claim, the district court, as in Johnson Controls, treated the policy as facially
neutral and applied a disparate impact mode of analysis. 332 Based on this stan-
dard, the district court upheld the policy as a matter of business necessity. 333
The Sixth Circuit reversed and sharply criticized the Johnson Controls ap-
proach. The appellate court intially reviewed the impact of the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act amendments and concluded that the General Motors policy,
being premised on pregnancy-related distinctions, must be characterized as
facially discriminatory under Title VII.3 4 As such, the policy must be tested
under a BFOQ standard: "We agree with the view of the dissenters in Johnson
Controls that fetal protection policies perforce amount to overt sex discrimina-
tion, which cannot logically be recast as disparate impact and cannot be counte-
324. See id. at 542, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
325. See id. at 542, 548, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 171, 176.
326. See id. at 526-28, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 161-62.
327. The Johnson Controls' policy excludes women of childbearing capacity from jobs in which prior employ-
ees had recorded blood lead levels in excess of 30 ug/100 ml. Id. at 526, 267 Cal. Rptr. 161. The federal OSHA
standard requires that workers be removed from worksites if their blood lead level equals or exceeds 50 ug/100
ml. Id. at 527, 267 Cal. Rptr. 162. The OSHA standard recommends that both males and females exposed to lead
who plan to conceive should keep their blood lead levels below 30 ug/100 ml., but does not require their removal
from the workplace. Id.
328. The OSHA lead standard itself does not establish any standard specific to women employees. The at-
tachments to the standard's preamble states that "there is no basis in the record for preferential hiring of men
over women in the lead standard, nor will this final standard create a basis for exclusion from work of any person,
male or female, who is capable of procreating." Id. at 528, 267 Cal. Rptr. 162.
329. Id. at 536, 267 Cal. Rptr. 167.
330. 980 F.2d 1303 (6th Cir. 1990).
331. Id. at 1305. The General Motors' policy adopts the same lead level threshold as the Johnson Controls
policy.
332. See id. at 1306.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 1307-10.
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nanced without proof that infertility is a BFOQ. '3 5 Accordingly, the Sixth Cir-
cuit remanded the case for the purpose of allowing the employer to produce
evidence justifying the policy as a BFOQ.336
4. A BFOQ Proposal
The Supreme Court has now accepted the Johnson Controls decision for
review.337 This provides the Court with an opportunity to clarify both the appro-
priate scope of the BFOQ defense generally and the specific application of the
defense in fetal protection cases.
On the former issue, the Court should reaffirm the traditional scope of the
BFOQ defense. The substitution of a business necessity standard is a very awk-
ward fit in disparate treatment cases. Further, placing the burden of proof on
the plaintiff to disprove business necessity, as did the Johnson Controls court,
turns employment discrimination law on its head by making intentional discrim-
ination presumptively lawful. Even if the Court should decide that fetal protec-
tion cases require a more lenient standard of the type adopted in Johnson Con-
trols, it should make clear that this standard is neither applicable nor
appropriate in the broader context of Title VII.338
The Johnson Controls approach evokes more sympathy when the focus
narrows to fetal protection cases. The theme running throughout the three ex-
pansionary fetal protection cases is that fetal health is too important to be en-
dangered by the "rigid application of proof patterns. '3 39 The traditional BFOQ
standard, the argument continues, does not adequately value an employer's le-
gitimate concern for the health of employee offspring because it focuses too
narrowly on characteristics affecting job performance.340 Put less idealistically,
the traditional BFOQ standard does not protect an employer against the poten-
tial for huge monetary liability resulting from fetal damage.
Even in this narrower context, however, the Court should reject the John-
son Controls approach for at least three reasons. First, the fetal protection pol-
icy sustained in Johnson Controls sweeps too broadly. The Johnson Controls
policy presumes that all fertile women will bear children and that the rights of
the potential offspring automatically outweigh the rights of the potential female
335. Id. at 1310.
336. Id. at 1311. The BFOQ defense envisioned by the Sixth Circuit is similar to that of Judge Posner's
dissent in Johnson Controls. See Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 904 (Posner, J., dissenting). Both opinions inter-
pret the BFOQ defense as appropriately considering workplace hazards that may potentially endanger employee
offspring even if those hazards would not interfere with job performance itself. See Grant, 908 F.2d at 1311.
337. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
338. It is important for the Court to clarify the reach of its holding since both the Wright and Johnson
Controls decisions can be read as inviting the use of a business necessity standard in other types of Title VII cases.
In Wright. for example, the Fourth Circuit suggests that the employer can select whether to assert a BFOQ or a
business necessity defense as a matter of litigation strategy. Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1185-86, n.21
(1982). In Johnson Controls, the Ninth Circuit warns against the rigid application of proof patterns. UAW v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 883 (1989). At a minimum, the Court should limit any expansion of the
defense standard to a sui generis exception applicable because of the unique considerations posed by fetal protec-
tion policies.
339. See. e.g., Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 883.
340. See, e.g., Wright, 697 F.2d at 1185-86, n.21.
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workers.3 41 The policy excludes all fertile women even though only a small frac-
tion will actually become pregnant on the job if hired. 34 2 In addition, most of
these pregnancies will result in the delivery of healthy children.343
The Johnson Controls policy also is too broad because of the court's failure
to address the possibility of less discriminatory alternatives.3 4 4 The most obvious
alternative is to provide female applicants with informed warnings of the poten-
tial for fetal harm that may result from lead exposure.3 45 At a minimum, such
warnings will likely reduce the number of hazardous pregnancies in a voluntary,
self-selecting manner.3 46 An informed warning alternative is also consistent with
the societal norm recognizing the mother's primary responsibility for making
decisions concerning the health of the fetus she is carrying.3 47 Other alterna-
tives, including the possible use of respirators, selective work assignments, and
early pregnancy detection programs, also deserve consideration.
At the same time, the Johnson Controls policy is also too narrow in that it
focuses on health risks resulting from working mothers but not working fathers.
The Johnson Controls court discounted evidence of reproductive and offspring
health dangers through paternal exposure largely on burden of proof grounds.34 8
When the burden was appropriately placed on the employer in Johnson Con-
trols II, that court concurred with OSHA in finding that the impact of lead
exposure on employee offspring was similar for both sexes.34 9
By excluding from the workplace all fertile women, but only fertile women,
the Johnson Controls policy is all too reminiscent of the sex-specific protective
341. See Comment, Fetal Protection Programs Under Title VIll-Rebutting the Procreation Presumption,
46 U. PiTt. L. REV. 755, 756 (1985) (these policies presume that women employees are "ready, willing and able to
procreate. Sexual activity or celibacy, marital status, use of contraception, and a person's announced intention not
to parent" are irrelevant).
342. Becker, supra note 121, at 1232-33. The author compiles data indicating some interesting statistics.
Approximately 9 % of all fertile women become pregnant each year, but this percentage varies by age, occupation
and status. For example, the birth rate for blue-collar women over 30, the prime applicant pool for lead exposure
jobs, is only about 2%. One would assume that the rate of pregnancy would decline even further among women
who are informed of the dangers to fetal health resulting from lead exposure.
343. See Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 913 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
344. The Seventh Circuit disposed of this element by noting that the plaintiff had not carried its burden of
proving the existence of less discriminatory alternatives. Id. at 890-93. Once again, this illustrates the court's error
in borrowing the burden of proof rules normally applicable in cases of disparate impact. The employer is in a far
better position to produce evidence concerning the possible alternatives that it considered and rejected before
adopting the sex-based employment policy.
345. A number of states have enacted "right-to-know" laws that require employers to provide information
and training to employees concerning the dangers posed by working with hazardous substances to which they are
routinely exposed. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 182.65 (1988).
346. See Becker, supra note 121, at 1242. See also Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 907 (Posser, J., dissent-
ing) ("The plaintiffs believe that a real 'scare' warning would have deterred these eight pregnancies [that occurred
before the fetal protection policy was adopted]; maybe they are right.").
347. See Becker, supra note 121, at 1242 ("The risks associated with decisions to smoke or drink during
pregnancy seem less likely to benefit living and potential children than the risks associated with employment.").
348. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 889-90 ("[T]he UAW has failed to present facts sufficient to carry its
burden of demonstrating the absence . ..of the risk of transmitting lead exposure to unborn children only
through females.").
349. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. California Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 218 Cal. App. 3d 517, 536-
39, 267 Cal. Rptr. 158, 167-69 (1990). See also Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconcili-
ation of Fetal Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals Under Title VII, 69 GEo. Li. 641, 655-65 (1981)
(reviews scientific evidence and concludes that it is unwarranted, in most instances, to assume that reproductive
hazards resulting from workplace exposure to toxic substances occurs only through women workers).
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laws that predated Title VII. One commentator, after a thoughtful review of the
policy underpinnings of these respective measures, concluded that:
Each of the troubling aspects of sex-specific protectionist legislation recurs in the con-
temporary debate over fetal vulnerability policies: the refusal to consider the effects of
policies on women, the identification of women with (and only with) reproductive
functions, the willingness to limit women's employment opportunities without evidence
that women's employment poses real risks to others, the exclusion only of women per-
ceived as marginal workers, and the assumption that women are not competent deci-
sion makers.3 50
One of Title VII's earliest impacts was to preempt state laws that excluded
women from employment because of their child-bearing capabilities."' Such
laws, the Supreme Court once noted, "put women, not on a pedestal, but in a
cage."352 Title VII replaced the romantic paternalism of these laws with a man-
date for equal treatment. The resurrection of similar stereotyping assumptions
in the guise of a business necessity justification for discrimination is an unfortu-
nate step backwards in Title VII jurisprudence.
A further problem with creating an exception under Title VII for fetal
protection cases is the inappropriateness of using Title VII as a vehicle for im-
plementing workplace safety policies. The purpose of Title VII is to eliminate
discrimination, not to regulate workplace safety. Congress created a separate
federal statutory scheme-the Occupational Safety and Health Act 5 -- to fur-
ther this latter goal.
Fetal protection policies require an accommodation between these two stat-
utory enactments and their respective goals of curbing discrimination and en-
suring a safe work environment. Unfortunately, the Johnson Controls decision
fails in this task. The Johnson Controls court sustained a sex-based employment
practice for the purpose of implementing a safety policy that exceeds and ar-
guably conflicts with pertinent OSHA requirements.354
An appropriate accommodation of these competing policies is to leave the
issue of workplace safety to the agency created for that purpose-OSHA. If
OSHA standards necessitate a sex-based hiring policy to implement the goal of
a safe work environment, then the strictures of Title VII should give way unless
a less discriminatory alternative is feasible. On the other hand, the anti-discrim-
ination goal of Title VII should prevail when a safety policy exceeds or conflicts
with OSHA requirements. This formula is preferable to that of Johnson Con-
350. Becker, supra note 121, at 1229. Similar concerns were expressed in Williams, supra note 349, at 654-
55.
351. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
352. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) ("fOlur Nation has had a long and unfortunate
history of sex discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of romantic pater-
nalism which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.").
353. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1988). The Act is administered by the Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion (OSHA) which is empowered to adopt standards "reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or
healthful employment or places of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1988).
354. A comparison of the Johnson Controls policy and OSHA regulations is discussed supra, notes 326-29
and accompanying text.
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trols which leaves both issues to the ad hoe discretion of individual
employers 555
Thus, the Johnson Controls expansion of the BFOQ defense goes too far
even in the specific context of fetal protection policies. The Supreme Court
should use the Johnson Controls appeal to reaffirm the appropriateness of the
traditional BFOQ defense in cases of intentional discrimination, including fetal
protection cases, with the employer bearing the burden of establishing its need
for the otherwise discriminatory practice.
Admittedly, this approach will not assuage employer concerns over poten-
tial liability if OSHA standards prove too lenient. Even informed, signed waiv-
ers by female employees will not bar their offsprings' right to sue the employer
for prenatal injury356 But, equality is not always the most cost efficient alterna-
tive. Perhaps the real benefit of retaining a traditional BFOQ standard is that
this approach will provide employers with the necessary incentive to make the
workplace safe for all employees as opposed to adopting policies that simply
exclude women workers without changing the work environment. 57
IV. CONCLUSION
The five court of appeals decisions reviewed in this article have significantly
expanded upon the traditional scope of the BFOQ defense to intentional dis-
crimination. The Torres case does so by adjusting the existing BFOQ test to
increase the extent of judicial deference to managerial decision-making. The
remaining four decisions accomplish a similar expansion by substituting the
more lenient business necessity standard usually applicable only in disparate
impact cases. Regardless of the analytical methodology, each of these cases has
the practical effect of upholding a sex-based employment practice that would be
of questionable validity under a traditional BFOQ model.
This expansion has been invoked for a familiar purpose. All five of these
cases sustain practices that provide special protection with respect to women.
The role-model cases shield women from negative psychological influences. The
fetal protection cases shield the potential offspring of women from workplace
health hazards. Although these specific goals may be laudatory in another con-
text, this pedestal is once again a cage in reality.
In his dissenting opinion in Johnson Controls, Judge Posner stated that "a
narrow reading [of the BFOQ exception] is ...inevitable. A broad reading
would gut the statute."358 These five decisions threaten this notion of inevitabil-
ity. The use of a business necessity test in the context of disparate treatment
355. Since the Johnson Controls court placed the burden of disproving business necessity on the plaintiff.
UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 887-88 (1989), it is conceivable that individual employers can
adopt a wide variety of fetal protection policies, any of which can support the exclusion of female employees.
356. While a female employee could waive her own cause of action under appropriate circumstances, an
agreement to waive a cause of action belonging to her child would be illegal and unenforceable. See Williams,
supra note 349, at 646. Some commentators suggest that Congress should consider a legislative solution that not
only bans sex-based exclusionary policies, but also limits potential tort awards. See Becker, supra note 121, at
1246, 1264; Comment, supra note 251, at 982.
357. See Buss, supra note 131, at 590-91.
358. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 903 (Posner, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 52:5
1991] BFOQ REVISITED: JOHNSON CONTROLS 47
considerably increases the breadth of the exception. Placing the burden on the
plaintiff to disprove business necessity, as the Johnson Controls decision does,
further transforms this broader exception into a presumption. The gutting pro-
cess may now be at hand for the once narrow BFOQ defense to Title VII's ban
on intentional discrimination.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
ADDENDUM
The Supreme Court decided the Johnson Controls appeal on March 20,
1991.1 The Court, not surprisingly, reversed the Seventh Circuit and its reliance
on the business necessity standard. More surprisingly, the Seventh Circuit's
business necessity approach failed to garner even one vote, and even the broad-
based BFOQ urged by Judge Posner fell short of majority support. The Court,
instead, predicated its decision on a very narrow reading of the BFOQ defense
that parallels closely the recommendations of my article. Hopefully, this narrow
reading will stem the recent and inappropriate expansion of the BFOQ defense.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
The justices authored three separate opinions in deciding Johnson Con-
trols. All of the justices agreed that Johnson Controls' fetal protection policy
was facially discriminatory. The point of divergence concerned the proper scope
of the BFOQ defense. The majority opinion, written by Justice Blackmun, ad-
hered to the traditional narrow interpretation of the BFOQ defense.2 Justice
White, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy, authored a concurring
opinion that advocated a more expansive interpretation.3 Finally, Justice Scalia
delivered a separate concurrence that, on the BFOQ issue at least, adopted a
construction similar to that of Justice White.
4
The Court had little difficulty in unanimously concluding that the Johnson
Controls policy constituted disparate treatment discrimination. Expressly dis-
agreeing with the disparate impact approach utilized by the courts of appeal in
the Wright, Hayes, and Johnson Controls cases,5 the Court found the policy
facially discriminatory even without reference to the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act.' The Court explained that the policy classifies on the basis of gender,
rather than fertility alone, since it excludes only fertile women and not fertile
men from the workplace.7 The Pregnancy Discrimination Act "bolsters" this
conclusion by making classifications based on pregnancy explicit sex discrimina-
tion for the purposes of Title VII.8
This unanimity disappeared, however, once the Court turned its attention
to the BFOQ issue. The majority opinion adopted a narrow construction of the
BFOQ defense similar to that described in Judge Easterbrook's dissent below.9
1. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 59 U.S.L.W. 4209 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1991) (No. 89-1215).
2. Id. In addition to Justice Blackmun, Justices Marshall, Stevens, O'Connor and Souter joined in the major-
ity opinion.
3. Johnson Controls, 59 U.S.L.W. at 4215 (White, J., concurring).
4. Id. at 4218 (Scalia, J., concurring).
5. These three decisions are discussed supra at notes 213-79 and accompanying text.
6. Johnson Controls, 59 U.S.L.W. 4209, 4211-12.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 4212.
9. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 908 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting), rev'd 59
U.S.L.W. 4209 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1991) (No. 89-1215). Judge Easterbrook's dissenting opinion is discussed supra at
notes 275-76 and accompanying text.
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After reviewing the statutory language 0 and those cases recognizing a safety-
based BFOQ," the majority endorsed the traditional view that a BFOQ "is
limited to instances in which sex or pregnancy actually interferes with the em-
ployee's ability to perform the job.""' Justice Blackmun also found support for
this approach in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act which, he concluded, con-
tains a similar BFOQ standard of its own. That is, the PDA mandates that
pregnant employees be "treated the same" as other employees unless the preg-
nant employees differ "in their ability or inability to work.""
The majority opinion concluded that Johnson Controls could not establish a
BFOQ for its fetal protection policy under this standard. An employee's ability
to perform the job, Justice Blackmun explained, must be scrutinized with refer-
ence to the "essence" of the employer's business.'4 Applying a narrow focus to
the "business essence" prong of the BFOQ test,' 5 the majority described the
essence of Johnson Controls' business as "batterymaking." Johnson Controls'
concern for the welfare of future children, no matter how laudable, is simply
not a part of the "essence" of its business.' Accordingly, the asserted BFOQ
must fail because "[flertile women ... participate in the manufacture of batter-
ies as efficiently as anyone else.' 7
In contrast, the concurring opinion of Justice White interpreted the BFOQ
defense more expansively. Based upon reasoning similar to Judge Posner's dis-
sent in the Seventh Circuit Johnson Controls decision,' 8 the White concurrence
argued that "the defense is broad enough to include considerations of cost and
safety of the sort that could form the basis for an employer's adoption of a fetal
protection policy."' 9 In effect, this concurring opinion interpreted the business
essence of Johnson Controls broadly so as to encompass not just batterymaking,
but the making of batteries in a manner that protects fetal safety and avoids
substantial tort liability.' 0 To Justice White, the essence of a business does not
stop at mere job performance, but includes reasonable efforts to protect the
10. The majority opinion states that the use of the term "occupational" in the statutory definition of the
BFOQ defense indicates that the necessity for a policy of gender bias must "concern job-related skills and apti-
tudes." See Johnson Controls, 59 U.S.L.W. at 4212.
II. These cases are discussed supra at notes 121-33 and accompanying text.
12. Johnson Controls, 59 U.S.L.W. at 4213.
13. See id. at 4213, quoting language from the Pregnancy Discrimintion Act amendments to Title VII, codi-
fled at 20 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). The concurring opinion of Justice White disagrees and asserts that the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act "did not purport to eliminate or alter the BFOQ defense." Johnson Controls, 59 U.S.L.W. at
4217 (White, J., concurring).
14. Johnson Controls, 59 U.S.L.W. at 4213-14.
15. The "business essence" element of the BFOQ test is discussed supra at notes 77-92 and accompanying
text.
16. Johnson Controls, 59 U.S.L.W. at 4213-14. The majority opinion goes on to state that "[d]ecisions about
the welfare of future children must be left to the parents who conceive, bear, support, and raise them rather than
to the employers who hire their parents." Id. at 4214.
17. Id. at 4214.
18. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 904 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J., dissenting), rev'd, 59
U.S.L.W. 4209 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1991) (No. 89-1215). Judge Posner's dissenting opinion is discussed supra at notes
277-79 and accompanying text.
19. Johnson Controls, 59 U.S.L.W. at 4216 (White, J., concurring).
20. See id. at 4215-17.
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safety of third parties (such as future offspring) endangered by that job
performance.21
Justice Scalia also took issue with the majority for rejecting any cost-based
defense short of that threatening the actual survival of the enterprise.22 He sug-
gested, instead, that a BFOQ is appropriate for situations in which a nonexclu-
sive gender policy would be technically feasible but "inordinately expensive. '23
The opinions also disagreed about the likelihood of an employer such as
Johnson Controls incurring substantial tort liability in the absence of an exclu-
sionary fetal protection policy. The majority stated that the potential for liabil-
ity is remote where the employer complies with applicable OSHA regulations
and warns employees of the dangers arising from lead exposure.24 In addition,
the majority suggested, although without deciding, that compliance with Title
VII may preempt liability under state tort laws.2"
The concurring opinions appear justified in their skepticism of the major-
ity's assessment of the potential for damages.2" As discussed in my article, em-
ployee warnings and compliance with OSHA requirements likely will not be
sufficient to insulate an employer from potential liability to injured offspring.27
Moreover, Justice Scalia is correct in pointing out that preemption only results
when compliance with Title VII requires a violation of state tort law.2 8 In the
fetal protection context, it appears possible for an employer to avoid such a
conflict by providing a safe workplace for both sexes.
In spite of these disagreements, both concurring opinions joined in the
Court's judgment reversing the Seventh Circuit. Justice Scalia, although diverg-
ing from the majority on the appropriateness of a cost-based defense, neverthe-
less concurred on the grounds that Johnson Controls did not, in fact, assert a
cost-based BFOQ in this case.2
Justice White concurred for a different reason-the Seventh Circuit's mis-
handling of the burden of proof issue. As Justice White noted, the lower courts'
resolution of this case by summary judgment leaves the record devoid of evi-
dence on a number of important issues, including the potential for injury to
offspring resulting from lead exposure to male workers. 30 The Seventh Circuit
21. Id. at 4217, n.5.
22. With respect to the asserted cost defense, the majority opinion concluded as follows: "We, of course are
not presented with, nor do we decide, a case in which costs would be so prohibitive as to threaten the survival of
the employer's business. We merely reiterate our prior holdings that the incremental cost of hiring women cannot
justify discriminating against them." Id. at 4215.
23. Id. at 4218-19 (Scalia, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 4214.
25. Id. at 4214-15.
26. Id. at 4216 (White, J., concurring) and at 4218 (Scalia, J., concurring).
27. See supra note 356 and accompanying text.
28. See 59 U.S.L.W. at 4218 (Scalia, J., concurring). See generally California Federal Say. and Loan Ass'n
v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 290-92 (1987) (Title VII does not preempt state statute if employer can tailor its
employment practices to comply with both laws).
29. See Johnson Controls, 59 U.S.L.W. at 4219 (Scalia, J., concurring).
30. Id. at 4218. Justice Scalia contended that the issue of male exposure is irrelevant because it only pertains
to determining whether the Johnson Controls policy is facially discriminatory, which is an issue already answered
in the affirmative by the terms of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Id. Justice White's concurrence, however,
apparently agrees with Judge Posner that the male exposure issue also is relevant to the BFOQ analysis in that "if
that hazard is significant the fact that Johnson Controls does nothing about it undermines the company's argu-
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was able to affirm the grant of summary judgment for the employer in this
context primarily by adopting a business necessity approach and placing the
burden of proof as to this issue on the plaintiff. Thus, the Seventh Circuit con-
cluded that summary judgment was appropriate because the plaintiffs had
failed to produce evidence sufficient to disprove the asserted business necessity
defense.31 Justice White's concurrence joined with the majority in requiring a
BFOQ mode of analysis under which the employer bears the burden of proving
the existence of a BFOQ defense.32 Under this approach, Justice White con-
cluded that the grant of summary judgment was inappropriate and that a trial
on the merits should result.3"
II. THE BFOQ DEFENSE AFTER JOHNSON CONTROLS
The Johnson Controls majority reaffirms the BFOQ defense as a very lim-
ited exception to Title VII's ban on overt discrimination. The majority adopts a
construction consistent with both the traditionally narrow scope of the BFOQ
defense and the recommendations of my article. The decision not only halts the
recent expansion of the BFOQ exception, but appears to signal a major reversal
in that process as well.
The majority accomplishes this reversal by rejecting many of the core ex-
pansionary principles underlying the five appellate court decisions discussed in
my article. First of all, the Court reaffirms that cases of disparate treatment are
to be analyzed with reference to the BFOQ defense rather than the business
necessity defense. Interestingly, this conclusion is unstated. The majority simply
finds facial discrimination and then proceeds to the BFOQ inquiry.34 None of
the three opinions even mention the possibility of an alternative business neces-
sity approach. Conceivably, this silence could be interpreted as not foreclosing
the possibility of a business necessity approach in another disparate treatment
context. The unquestioned application of the traditional disparate treatment/
BFOQ equation, however, makes this unlikely.
Secondly, the Court places the BFOQ burden of proof on the employer as
opposed to the Seventh Circuit's determination that it is up to the plaintiff to
disprove the existence of business necessity. This conclusion flows naturally
from the rejection of the business necessity standard. No court, not even the
Seventh Circuit, has suggested shifting the burden of proof on the BFOQ issue.
Again, the majority simply applies the traditional burden of proof rules without
discussion. 35 The concurring opinion of Justice White, however, expressly re-
jected the Seventh Circuit's allocation of the evidentiary burden.3,
ment that its fetal protection policy is motivated by concern for the fetus and reasonably necessary to the opera-
tion of the battery business." UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.,
dissenting), rev'd. 59 U.S.L.W. 4209 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1991) (No. 89-1215).
31. See id. at 886 F.2d 871, 883-93. The Seventh Circuit's use of a business necessity standard is criticized,
supra, at notes 280-308 and accompanying text.
32. Johnson Controls, 59 U.S.L.W. at 4218 (White, J., concurring).
33. Id.
34. See Id. at 4212.
35. See id. at 4214.
36. See id. at 4218 (White, J., concurring).
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These two conclusions, alone, would support a reversal of the Seventh Cir-
cuit's decision in Johnson Controls. The Supreme Court went further, however,
and described a very strict test for the BFOQ exception.
Of particular significance, the majority opinion rejected a broad construc-
tion of the "business essence" element of the BFOQ test. The Seventh Circuit,
in the Torres and Johnson Controls decisions, interpreted the employer's busi-
ness mission broadly in sustaining exclusionary employment practices. In
Torres, the business essence of a women's prison included not just prison secur-
ity, but also a rehabilitative environment free of any male presence. 37 Similarly,
Johnson Controls did not just make batteries, it made batteries without adverse
fetal safety or cost consequences.3 8 Justice White's concurrence endorsed this
more liberal reading of the business essence element,39 but Justice Blackmun
disagreed. The business essence element, according to the majority opinion,
properly focuses on the "central purpose of the enterprise" and the "core of the
employee's job performance."'40 A safety-based BFOQ, therefore, is limited to
instances in which sex or pregnancy actually interferes with the employee's abil-
ity to perform the job.41 Similarly, the majority opinion severely limited the
potential for a BFOQ premised on cost considerations noting that, at least short
of a financial situation that threatens the survival of the business enterprise it-
self, an employer cannot justify discrimination because of the "incremental cost
of hiring women." 42
The majority's narrow reading of the "business essence" element is the cor-
rect one. As discussed in my article, a broad essence factor affords employers
too much of an opportunity to justify exclusionary practices by defining its own
business mission in convenient detail. 41
The Court's opinion also retains a strict interpretation of the "all or sub-
stantially all" factor. The appellate court decisions in Chambers and Torres
virtually dispensed with this factor by deferring broadly to the employer's own
assessment as to the need for a sex-specific policy.44 In Johnson Controls, how-
ever, both Justice Blackmun and Justice White agreed that this element of the
BFOQ test must be construed as a limitation on sex-specific employment prac-
tices.4' 5 Justice Blackmun pointed out that few women in high risk positions at
37. See Tortes v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health and Social Servs., 859 F.2d 1523, 1529-30 (7th Cir. 1988). The
Torres decision is discussed supra at notes 156-67 and accompanying text.
38. See UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 895-96 (7th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 59 U.S.L.W. 4209
(U.S. Mar. 20, 1991) (No. 89-1215).
39. See Johnson Controls, 59 U.S.L.W. at 4216-17 (White, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 4213.
41. Id. Justice Blackmun rejected the concurrence's argument that fetal safety is part of the employer's
business mission by stating that the "unconceived fetuses of Johnson Controls' female employees, however, are
neither customers nor third parties whose safety is essential to the business of batterymaking." Id.
42. Id. at 4215. The opinions of both Justice White, id. at 4216-17, and Justice Scalia, id. at 4218, disagree
with this strict limitation on the possibility of a cost-based BFOQ.
43. See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
44. See supra notes 175-87 and accompanying text.
45. Justice Scalia declined to address this factor, finding it "irrelevant" given the mandate of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act. See Johnson Controls, 59 U.S.L.W. at 4218 (Scalia, J., concurring). The majority opinion
did discuss the "all or substantially all" element but acknowledged that it "is somewhat academic in light of our
conclusion that the company may not exclude fertile women at all." Id. at 4214. In contrast, Justice White's
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Johnson Controls will become pregnant on the job and substantially fewer yet
will bear injured children."" Justice White agreed that the Johnson Controls
policy "reaches too far. '4 7 The majority opinion concluded that "Johnson Con-
trols' fear of prenatal injury, no matter how sincere, does not begin to show that
substantially all of its fertile women employees are incapable of doing their
jobs."'18
In spite of the Johnson Controls decision, the potential for a future return
to the expansionary viewpoints of the five appellate court decisions discussed in
my article should not be dismissed entirely. For one thing, the Johnson Controls
Court did not address all of the arguments relied upon in the expansionary
cases. The Court, for example, was not required to address the issue of whether
a BFOQ determination requires the support of expert or objective evidence of
some kind.4 9 More significantly, the majority's narrow construction won the
support of only five justices. The appointment of a more conservative jurist than
Justice Souter, for whom the oral arguments in Johnson Controls were his first
as a sitting member of the Court, may well have led to a very different formula-
tion of the BFOQ test.
Nonetheless, the Johnson Controls decision is a stunning reaffirmance of a
narrow BFOQ standard. The majority opinion is significant in this regard for its
tenor as well as its doctrinal pronouncements. At the conclusion of his opinion,
Justice Blackmun compares the Johnson Controls policy with the sex-specific
protectionist legislation criticized in my article5 0 because of its similar function
as an excuse for gender inequality. Justice Blackmun condemns both sources of
gender-based protectionism by stating: "It is no more appropriate for the courts
than it is for individual employers to decide whether a woman's reproductive
role is more important to herself and her family than her economic role. Con-
gress has left this choice to the woman as hers to make."5' For the time being,
at least, the Supreme Court in Johnson Controls has halted the expansion of
the BFOQ defense.
opinion, having rejected the majority's narrow construction of "business essence," found this element determina-
tive. See Id. at 4218 (White, J., concurring). Justice White also invoked the third element of the BFOQ test by
explaining that the Court must consider the viability of alternative practices, including a comparison of the man-
ncr in which the employer responds to other risks, before sustaining a gender-based exclusion. See id., n.10. For a
discussion or the "less discriminatory alternative" element of the BFOQ test, see supra notes 102-06 and accom-
panying text.
46. Johnson Controls, 59 U.S.L.W. at 4214.
47. Id. at 4218 (White, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 4214.
49. See supra notes 175-87 and accompanying text.
50. See supra notes 24-26, 350-52 and accompanying text.
51. Johnson Controls, 59 U.S.L.W. at 4215.
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